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1.1 Statement of the Problem 
In the past decade, the term Taishang was added to our 
heavily used daily vocabulary. People tended to call the 
Taiwanese merchants in Mainland China Taishang. In spite of 
the fact that trading with Mainland China was severely banned 
by Taiwan government before 1987, quite a few merchants had 
already gone to the Mainland in the early 1980s. Out of 
personal enthusiasm and profit motive, those petty bourgeois 
began their business adventure in a Chinese society with 
different social and political systems. In fact, they were 
illegal traders. With the official permission of home visit 
for Mainlanders beginning from 1987, more local Taiwan 
Chinese looked for their business opportunities in the 
Mainland journey. It especially attracted the small investors 
intending to relocate their labor-intensive industries. 
Taiwan government legalizied wide categories of indirect 
trade and investment flows towards China in the early 1990s. 
Numerous big entrepreneurs and the needed professional 
managers thus entered into the Mainland. Taishang no longer 
referred only to small Taiwanese merchants. They could be 
businesspeople investing and running large-scale enterprises. 
Taishang comprisd of a rich variety of Taiwanese engaging 
themselves in business activities in Mainland China. 
1 
Traditionally, businesspeople were seldom treated as 
both merchants of ideas and amateur anthropologists in their 
cross cultrual travels. However, Randall Stross lively 
delineated the interplay among business, culture, ideology 
and personality in his Bulls in the China Shop (1990). 
Unlike those popular authors simply focusing on capital 
investments and showing the ropes of doing business in China, 
Stross paid special attention to the emotional investments 
made by American merchants in Mainland China. Those American 
businesspeople and their Chinese counterparts, "in the 
course of negotiating, selling, buying, hiring, training, 
socializing, and arguing, gave considerable thought to 
larger issues concerning their own identities and belief" 
(Stross 1990:xv). Likewise, the psycho-cultural attributes 
shared by Taiwanese merchants that predisposed them to 
peculiar type of business and management behaviors in the 
Mainland also merited attention. As the number of Taiwan 
businessmen in China became larger, there came a topic for 
applied anthropologists to rethink their traditional goals 
and newly acquired missions. The hidden dimension of this 
emerging group's psyche itself could constitute a challenge 
for those cultural brokers exploring the human problems of 
Taiwanese enterprises in Mainland China. 
This research attempts to identify the socio-cultural 
background of the business practice in two areas sharing 
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common traditional culture, and to see how the conventional 
value or cultural heritage functions as an active agent to 
work upon the business dialogues between the ethnic Chin~se 
in Taiwan and the Mainland. A brief comparison between 
Taiwanese and other foreign investments in the Mainland 
could reveal the cultural factors influencing their divergent 
propensities towards capital involvement. Based on such 
understanding, I seek to analyze certain behaviors of 
Taiwanese merchants cultivated by Chinese traditional 
culture with relation to their economic performances in 
Mainland China. 
However, the study of beliefs and values about economic 
action cost time and care to go through the methodological 
approaches. My anthropological interest in this hot business 
dialogues between Taiwan and the Mainland was mainly aroused 
by the strong disagreement between the two entities on 
political affairs. Never did I deny the great contribution of 
political economics in shedding light on the growth or 
dilemmas of this interactions, but regarded the cultural 
diversity in business as an area in which insights from 
anthropology could also serve society (Hofstede 1991:249). I 
was further reassured by Clifford Geertz's words in his 
Peddlers and Princes, "anthropological studies add depth 
and realism to the more abstract and formal analyses 
characteristic of aggregative economics" (Geertz 1963:143). 
Geertz took a close look into the ideology of sharp contrast 
3 
residing in the deep interiors of the petty bourgeois Muslim 
merchants and the haughty Hinduized aristocrates. He 
investigated the relationships between motive and other 
social institutions, as well as the ethics triggering modern 
socio-economic development. Impressed with the images of the 
two patterns of economic behavior portrayed by Geertz in 
Indonesia, Helen Siu also took special notice of the motive 
force behind the princely organizations paralleling collective 
enterprises in socialist China and the emerging peddlerlike 
small-scale private entrepreneurs to study the problems of 
economic liberalization in a market town in South China (Siu 
1989). It turned out to be a successful effort. Both their 
data collecting ways and narration methods enlighten me a lot. 
This thesis will appear as an ethnographic description 
interwoven with empirical case studies and qualitative 
analysis. In addition to the related literature reviews, my 
impression for the specific cultural features affecting 
people's interaction at the behavioral level was largely 
based on the managerial ideology interviews with certain 
ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and some officials concerned. 
More often than not the field trips could only whet my 
appetite to know more about the intricacy existing in their 
relations as well as the causal significance between 
ethnicity, cultural identity and the business discourses in 
a co-tradition area. 
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1.2 Literature Reviews 
As to the business activities and Chinese connections 
in Southeast Asia, both Eddie Kuo and Gungwu Wang called 
attention to the interplay between ethnicity, cultural 
identity, polity and economics (Kuo 1991; Wang 1988). I 
received the similar messages in my fieldwork encounters 
with Taiwanese merchants, ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong, 
Southeast Asia and North America, and certain Mainland 
officials. Being Chinese carrying either the meaning of 
ethnic identity or the historical contexts of cultural 
identity, could be an unseen power that ruled the capital 
involvements of those Chinese diasporas in Mainland China. 
Such a factor of great potential theorectical and empirical 
interests can ,not be over emphasized. This thesis is thus 
based on the hypothesis that historical context of cultural 
identity and ethnicity help to explain the increasing numbers 
of Taishang in Mainland China. 
Numerous Taiwanese firms were carried away by the 
investment opportunities opening up across the strait and 
set out to make their ventures on a first track. This large 
scale industrial relocation in Mainland China threw a great 
impact upon the political, economic and social aspects of 
Taiwan. It became the forum of spotlight discussing current 
Taiwan. There are scholars like Michael Hsiao and Alvin So 
exploring the problem from the socio-political perspectives 
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(Hsiao & So 1994). Joseph Bosco examines the socio-cultural 
dimensions of this cross-straits relationship (Bosco 1994). 
Po-hsun Cheng studies the organizational culture of the ' 
parent companies in Taiwan and their branch companies in 
Mainland China to compare their managerial similarities and 
differences in value orientation (Cheng 1996). But there 
exist much more political economists like Charng Kao and 
Chi-tsung Huang (Kao 1995 & Liao 1995) engaging themselves 
in this discussion. The numerical data in the dazzling 
-tabular forms presented by these authors are neat indeed, 
especially for those manufacturing industries. A clear 
picture for economic interactions between Taiwan and the 
Mainland can be acquired through the mathematical models 
plus comprehensive literal explanations. As the economic and 
trade relations is a matter of utmost concern to most of the 
Taiwanese population, these economists become the stars of 
the popular China-advice business in Taipei. 
Nevertheless, such a quantitative analysis only partially 
assures us of the sound interpretations of the behavior 
patterns of businessmen. Man has his own affective attachment 
to specific traditional materials. This affect domain, 
according to Francis L.K. Hsu, "changes very little with 
social, economic, and political development. Affect means 
feeling: love or hate, sympathy or jealousy, ambition or 
alienation" (Hsu 1983:79). The Mainland's southern coastal 
provinces of Fujian and Guangdong happen to be the ancestral 
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homes of most native Taiwanese. Although hardly could they 
find any relatives or other connections there after centuries 
of separation, their affective attachment to certain 
conventional items altered very little with the passage of 
time. Like the early settlers, they still relished the 
same cookery, spoke Amoy Hokkien, and admired Matsu, Goddess 
of the Sea from Fujian, observed the specific social customs, 
and even conformed to the game rules handed down from 
generation to generation. The Chinese ways of doing business 
could not be exclusively free from those habitual grooves. 
In addition to the PRC's planning, the Special Economic 
Zones in Southern China endear themselves to the capitalists 
from Taiwan partly due to the socio-cultural development. In 
their case study of Fujian Province, Yue-man Yeung and David 
Chu also indicated such a potential connection between the 
Taiwanese investment and certain cultural factors due to 
similar ethnicity (Yeung & Chu 1995). 
So far, the number of literature discussing the Taiwanese 
enterprises in Mainland China from the socio-cultural 
perspectives was quite limited. Michael Hsiao and Alvin So 
(1994) investigated the socio-political origin of Taiwan's 
Mainland investment. Some reasons other than economic factors 
were pointed out to explain both the timing, the locale and 
the ownership, and the speed of its development. We thus 
could better understand why the small-medium enterprisers 
took the lead and chose the sole ownership form to invest in 
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Guangdong and Fujian starting from 1987 at a rapid speed. 
This weak small business class scarely had a say in a strong 
authoritarian state in shaping the industrial policy in the 
past few decades. They solved their desperate immediate 
problems by taking the advantage of Taiwan government' 
political liberalization and the Mainland home visit movement 
from 1987 to explore their business opportunities in Mainland. 
On the other hand, the Mainland's coastal development strategy 
offered preferrential treatment and physical infrastructure 
for them to relocate their labor-intensive industries in the 
southern provinces of the Mainland. Hsiao and So only briefly 
discussed the social networks of the small businessmen in the 
Mainland. But this short discussion was not enough for us to 
take a closer look on the socio-cultural resources used by 
Taiwanese merchants to facilitate their business operation 
in Mainland China. 
Joseph Bosco (1994) focused more on the socio-cultural 
dimension in his Xi amen field work paper. He noticed that 
Taiwanese used the cultural knowledge and the identity of 
"Taiwan compatriot" to do business there. Cultural knowledge 
helped them deal with bribery and other business problems. 
Being from Taiwan gave their enterprises certain priviledges. 
He delineated the multi-faceted nature of the ethnic and 
national identity of those Taiwanese merchants in Xiamen. 
Bosco also pointed out that the guanxi ties (i.e. social 
relationships) used by the Taishang in the Mainland was 
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more flexible and shallow than the ones they used in Taiwan. 
Although he sensed that such flexible guanxi ties helped 
them settle bribery and other business matters, he did not 
further explore the negative effect of such shallow guanxi. 
Quite a few Taiwanese merchants found their business planning 
jeopardized by such capricious guanxi. The social relations 
between Taiwanese merchants and their Chinese counterparts in 
Mainland must be different from the ones with their fellow 
Taiwanese in China. Again, Bosco did not carefully 
differentiate between the guanxi networks developed among 
Taiwanese businessmen in China and the ones derived from 
their interactions with the Mainlanders. 
Po-hsun Cheng (1996) adopted the psychological approach 
to investigate the organizational culture of Taiwan and 
Mainland China. He identified the major characteristics of 
the social orientation in this co-tradition area. The four 
major cultural values of these Chinese societies were 
familism orientation, relationship orientation, authority 
orientation and altruism orientation. Although modernization 
process might weaken the social orientation, it threw the 
impact upon the society in a slow and gradual manner. On the 
other hand, the enforcement of stern man-made institutions 
could cause drastic change of social orientation. The leaders 
of the socialist China imposed more policies deviating from 
traditional cultural belief. Cheng therefore regarded that 
Taiwanese might exhibit stronger traditional value orientation 
9 
10 
than the people of the Mainland. Socio-culture was the value 
system widely accepted by the social members. And social 
orientation could largely influence the organizational culture 
of the enterprises. The gratitude orientation was emphasized 
by both the people in Taiwan and the Mainland. But Taiwanese 
businesspeople revealed more familism, altruism and human 
relationship orientations. Cheng indicated the similar and 
different value orientations of the ethnic Chinese in Taiwan 
and the Mainland. Neverthess, he did not provide sufficient 
information on how such similarity and difference might 
influence the business outcome of Taiwanese investment in 
Mainland China. 
Recognizing the great impact of cognitive aspects of 
culture on managerial practice, S. Gordon Redding takes a 
psychological approach to study the dynamics of Chinese 
industrial capitalism (Redding 1990). His managerial ideology 
interviews with overseas Chinese entrepreneurs reminds us the 
words of Clifford Geertz in The Interpretation of Culture, 
"doing ethnography is like trying to read a manuscript 
written not in conventionalized graphs of sound but in 
transient examples of shaped behavior" (Geertz 1973:10). To 
Redding, the shaped organizational behavior is molded through 
long lasting sociocultural values, and the particular pattern 
of existing enterprises itself is a cultural artifact. In the 
course of socialization, one is instilled with the cultural 
belief that influencing his later life in a networked society, 
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and the subsequent business form of organization. 
Attitude, value and behavioral outcome might not be , the 
only cultural indicators to distinguish between "Chineseness". 
However, it can partially reveal the psychological conditions 
of Taiwan businesspeople in the Mainland and fill the lack of 
the extensive survey done by the economists stressing aggregate 
models. This research, therefore, chiefly considered Taishang 
and their enterprises in Mainland China with reference to the 
cultural tradition, social organization and the socio-cultural 
influence upon perception and action. Their business behaviors 
in Mainland China could be well examined from the aspects of 
their ethnic and cultural identities. This research attempted 
to add another important ethnographic study to the field of 
Taiwanese businesspeople in the Mainland. It also aimed to 
supplement the potential interests ignored by the existing 
limited literatures discussing them from the socio-cultural 
perspectives. 
1.3 Fieldwork 
How significant the Chinese culture or being Chineseness 
affected the outcome of business interactions in Mainland 
China? This is hard to tell from the scholarly publications 
or statistical materials. I also realized that using 
questionnaires or structured interviews to inquire into the 
sensitive issues might simply receive little feedback. So I 
turned to the participant observation and informal interviews 
to gain the successful access to the hints and echos of 
Taiwanese merchants. Except the Japanese with whom I 
interviewed in November 1994 in Tokyo, this fieldwork was 
chiefly conducted during June to December 1995. In Taipei 
and Hong Kong, I had interviewed with fifteen investors and 
managers working for Taiwanese and other foreign enterprises 
or multinational corporations in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Shantou, Dongguan and Fuzhou. One scholar of 
Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research in Taipei was 
consulted. In Xiamen, Fujian I interviewed many Taiwanese 
factory owners, Taiwanese managers or Mainland staff working 
for Taiwan enterprises, and six China officials. I also 
discussed my research topic with two political economics 
professors of the Xiamen University. I stayed a short period 
no more than one week in Beijing to do some interviews. The 
deeper and wider understanding for Taiwanese investments in 
China on the strength of solid field data was chiefly 
acquired from the participant observation in Xiamen. But, 
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the field data were surely beyond the Xiamen local information 
owing to the contacts with the informants from other regions. 
Some of the interviewees allowed me to indicate their 
real surnames and company names. Some of them asked me to 
change the real names to protect their confidences. They 
were promised anonymity. The individual backgrounds of the 
thirty-eight persons referred in this thesis were listed as 
index (see pp.15-20) for convenient reference. We usually 
took it for granted that the fortunes of individuals waxed 
and waned in different periods of history with the fate of 
the nation. But, it provided an interesting alternative to 
capture the great world in a nutshell by exercising the 
microscopic characteristic of ethnographic description. 
Personal accounts and life stories of the figures mentioned 
above could serve as the backdrop to present a theme of 
nation-wide concern. Their struggling experience would not 
deny itself to a very useful frame of reference for inquiry 
into certain aspects of social reality. 
Being a native Taiwanese knowing Amoy language and 
customs from growing up in Taiwan, I found Xiamen an ideal 
spot for me to straighten up the causal significance between 
cultural belief and business behaviors. Most of the objects 
I studied in Xiamen were small scale enterprises. It was 
easier to do the informal interviews and participant 
observation among those merchants. I also visited Eupa and 
Xianglu, the two largest Taiwan multinational corporation 
in Xiamen. However, I was alienated from the real scene of 
their internal activities by the formalized bureaucratic -
systems. Since their imposing buildings and socio-economic 
profiles heavily appeared on the cover stories, I could 
still take the best advantage of those reports by certain 
journalists with camera-eye. 
On the other hand, how the Mainland authorities took 
advantage of the ethnicity, cultural identity and inter-
personal relationships among overseas Chinese to facilitate 
their open reform policies also raised my attention in the 
fieldwork. "Xiamen ... has developed over the past decade 
thanks to the investment by capitalists, predominantly 
Fujianese, from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and the 
United States" (Tien Lun Dynasty Hotel 1995:186). My 
frequent encounters with the Chinese officials and Taiwan 
merchants there did allow me the chances to listen to their 
homogeneous or divergent voices arising from the cultural 
contacts of the two sides as well as their respective 
ideologies towards ethnic nations. In addition to the 
interview activities, I spent several days to tour the 
museums and schools donated by over~eas Chinese from Xiamen, 
especially the Jimei Business Academy by Jiageng Chen from 
Singapore. Then I had a talk with two finance professors in 
Xiamen University which was also donated by Jiageng Chen in 
1919. All these interviews and tours helped me understand 
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how the ethnicity, economy and polity might work together to 
influence the divergent developments of Chinese and non-
Chinese investments in Mainland China. The enthnographic 
description interwoven with analysis from Chapter 2 to 
Chapter 5 below was based on the fieldwork data and reference 
literatures. 
Interviewees Index: 
Mr. Chang: Aged 38. A Xiamen local resident working for a 
Taiwanese tea leaf company established in 1988 in Xiamen. 
Mr. Chen: Aged 32. A Taiwanese working as a senior technician 
for an American precision equipments company in Taipei. 
He usually went to Shanghai and other cities of Mainland 
about 3 to 4 times per year to demonstrate the products. 
Prof. Chen: Aged 42. A finance professor in Xiamen University. 
Miss Cheng: Aged 29. A Singaporean working for a Japanese 
financial institution in Hong Kong to develop the business 
relations with the Taiwanese merchants in Fujian. 
Mr. Chiang: Aged 58. A Taiwanese immigrant in Canada. The 
vice chairman of a golf club corporation established in 
1989 in Xiamen. He had been a bank manager in Taichung 
twenty years ago. 
Miss Chin: Aged 31. A Taiwanese. She worked for an American 
software company in Taipei after graduating from college. 
This company usually sent her to Beijing to demonstrate 
and promote products as needed. 
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Mr. Chu: Aged 45. A Xiamenese working as the strategic planning 
manager for Eupa, a Taiwan multinational corporation. This 
enterprise established its electric appliances plant in 
Xiamen in 1987. 
Mr. Fang: Aged 40. A local cadre in Xiamen. He had a close 
relation with the Tsai family. This Taiwanese family firm 
depended much on him to overcome bureaucratic problems in 
Xiamen. 
Mr. Fei: Aged 42. A Xiamen official of Association for 
Promotion of Asia-Pacific Economic and Cultural Exchanges. 
Mr. Feng: Aged 45. A Taiwanese working as the study and 
development manager for Xianglu Chemical Fibers Corporation 
in Xiamen. This overseas Chinese group was co-established 
in 1995 by Wen-jing Lin, Shao-liang Lin from Indonesia, 
Yu-how Chen from Taiwan and some Hong Kong partners. The 
ancestral home of all these overseas Chinese was Fuquin in 
Fujian Province. Chen is the director of Taiwan Tungtex 
related en~erprise. Tungtex also set up many plants in 
Thailand. The Lins' Group possesses two of the largest 
enterprises in Indonesia. The imposing building of the 
large-sized and advanced technological Xianglu Fiber 
Corporation plant has become one of the Xiamen architectural 
landmarks. 
Mr. Fu: Aged 33. An America-born Chinese working for an 
American multinational corporation in Shanghai since 1991. 
He has a Master degree in International Relations Studies 
from Columbia University. 
Mrs. Ho: Aged 33. A Taiwanese. The wife of a Taiwanese 
merchant in Shantou, Guangdong Province. The Ho couple 
stayed in their plastic cloth plant established in 1992. 
They went back to Taiwan only when there were other members 
of the family firm in Taipei took their turns to supervise 
the Shantou factory. 
Mr. Hsu: Aged 45. A Xiamenese. The vice president of a large 
China investment company in Hong Kong. 
Mr. Huang: Aged 48. A Taiwanese. The general manager of a 
Taiwan-China joint venture hotel in Xiamen. He was also 
one of the share holders of this enterprise. He gained 
his law and MBA degrees in USA. 
Mr. Kao: Aged 52. A Taiwanese real estate businessman in 
Xiamen. 
Dr. Kao: Aged 42. A researcher of Chung-Hua Institution for 
Economic Research in Taipei. He studied Taiwan investments 
in Mainland China. 
Mr. Kong: Aged 50. A Xiamen official in charge of Taiwan 
affairs. 
Mr. Kuo: Aged 30. A Taiwanese working as a special assistant 
to chairman for a Taiwan golf and country club corporation 
in Xiamen. He knew a Fujianese immigrant in Canada who run 
an entertaining business in Dongshan, Fujian. 
Mr. Lee: Aged 32. A Hongkongese working as a business 
development manager for an American freight forwording and 
project services company in Hong Kong. Every week he went 
to Guangzhou to coordinate the shipment matters for some 
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American enterprises in Beijing. 
Mr. Li: Aged 42. A Fujianese. The Secretary General of China 
Xiamen Association for Promotion of Asia-Pacific Economic 
and Cultural Exchanges. Before joining the Association, he 
had worked in the Special Economic Zones and Open Cities 
of Guangdong Province more than ten years. 
Prof. Li: Aged 60. A political economics professor in Xiamen 
University. He has a son working for the Amercian Express 
branch in Xiamen. 
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Mr. Lin: Aged 61. A retired Xiamen official. He worked as a 
consultant in a Taiwan tile manufacturing company in Xiamen. 
Mr. Liu: Aged 55. Holding a high position in Xiamen Committee 
of the Communist Party. He came from Hobei Province 15 
years ago. 
Miss Lu: Aged 23. A Xiamenese working as a sales manager 
for a Taiwan precision industrial company in Xiamen. She 
graduated from Jimei Business Academy and was the former 
secretary of Miss Tsai. She changed to the present job 
because her family moved to Gulangyu. 
Mr. Pei: Aged 46. A Taiwanese immigrant in USA. A jeweler. 
He usually went to Hunan Province to collect and buy red 
diamonds. 
Miss Siu: Aged 58. A Taiwanese working for a family firm in 
Taipei. This firm has an umbrella factory in Shenzhen. She 
accompanied her boss to the Shenzhen factory to support 
the technicians as needed. 
Mr. Su: Age 46. A Taiwanese selling plant medicinal materials. 
He had travelled all over northeast China since 1985 to 
identity the supply sources. He sometimes went to visit 
his Taiwanese friends doing business in Xiamen. 
Mr. Takeda: Aged 45. A Japanese running a knife and fork 
factory in Hobei Province. 
Mr. Tsai: Aged 53. A Taiwanese. The chairman of a mini-spring 
factory in Xiamen. 
Miss Tsai: Aged 26. The daughter of Mr. Tsai and the person-
in-charge of that mini-spring factory established in 1989. 
She looked for the business opportunities in Xiamen before 
graduating from Tamkang Colleage in Taipei. Now she 
becomes the Xiamen deputy of a famous Taiwan suit brand. 
Miss Tien: Aged 37. A Taiwanese working for a British 
financial service corporation in Taipei more than 5 years. 
In 1993 she was transferred to another branch in Beijing. 
She has a Master degree in Economics from Columbia 
University. 
Mr. Tseng: Aged 41. A Taiwanese. A professional lawyer 
studying foreign investment regulations in China. He had 
been to Mainland more than 150 times and traveled all over 
the major cities in Mainland China. He had an experience 
of doing ginseng business in Meizhou, Fujiang 10 years ago. 
Mr. Wang: Aged 43. A Taiwanese running a Mongolign barbecue 
restaurant in Xiamen. 
Mr. Wei: Aged 33. A Taiwanese working in an American 
consultative company. He conducted the Mainland market 
research projects for the American and European investors. 
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He gained his MBA and Operation Research degrees in USA. 
Mrs. Wen: Aged 58. A Taiwanese. Her husband is a Mainlander 
who moved to Taiwan in 1949. The Wen couple went to 
Shenzhen to run the real estate business in 1988. 
Miss Yeh: Aged 32. A Taiwanese. She worked for a porcelain 
enamel firm in Taipei after graduating from college. Many 
Taiwan factories supplying her company products relocated 
to Dongguan, Guangdong Province five years ago. She had to 
go to Dongguan herself every other month to coordinate the 
source supply since then. 
Mr. Yen: Aged 44. A Taiwanese working for a Dutch electric 
appliances company in Shanghai. He gained his MBA degree 
in USA. 
Mr. Yu: Aged 28. A Taiwanese. He went to Fuzhou and some 
other Fujian cities regularly to collect the shoe parts 
samples for his company in Taipei. About six shoe parts 
factories run by the Taiwanese in Fuzhou and its nearby 
cities offered his company export products. 
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Chapter 2 
China Policy Towards Foreign Investment and the Entry Mode 
of Taiwanese Investors 
2.1 China Policy in SEZ and Foreign Investment 
Throughout the thesis, my empirical case studies 
chiefly focused on the Taiwanese enterprises established 
in 1980s. Their entry into Mainland China happened to be a 
time that China initiated a policy to invite the overseas 
capital to develop its industrial construction and commercial 
growth. Many tax breaks and flexible polJcies to encourage 
overseas investment in the ancestral places of the investors 
were issued during this period. These policies also allowed 
the local governments of Guangdong and Fujian more autonomy 
to deal with the contacts with the overseas Chinese investors. 
The capital, technology and business acumen of the 
extensive Chinese diaspora population had been taken into 
consideration in the designing of the Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ). "Each of the original Special Economic Zones was 
located according to its principal market. In th~ case of 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai this meant being easily accessible to 
Hong Kong, an economic powerhouse with strong family 
connections in Guangdong. Xiamen has similar advantages, 
being close to Taiwan and the ancestral birthplace of many 
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Taiwanese. Shantou is regarded as a traditional homeland for 
Chaozhou people who have made good in Southeast Asia and other 
parts of the Overseas Chinese world (Tien Lun Dynasty Hotel 
1995:179). They were planned to attract those overseas Chinese 
to invest in their ancestral places in the early 1980s. 
In fact, the China policy itself had gone through a 
changing process from 1970s to 1990s. During the Great 
Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, the influence of overseas 
kins was deemed as a colonial pollution to the Chinese 
patriotism and was thus discouraged. In 1980s China adopted 
an open economic policy to invite the overseas capital to 
develop its industrial construction and commercial facilities. 
Chinese diaspora were welcome to visit home and invest in 
their native places. Guangdong, Fujian and other south 
coastal provinces were thus carefully planned to serve the 
needs of small-medium export-oriented investors from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. With the fast industrial and 
commercial growth in the past decade, China adopted an even 
more open policy in 1990s to allow the service industry and 
other third industry aiming at Mainland consumers to enter 
into the China market. The large-scale multinational 
corporations from all over the world found thems 7lves having 
more space of flexibility to maneuver in the China market. 
In the case study of Hong Kong and Macau businessmen' 
participating in China rural enterprise development, Eugene 
Cooper and Xiong Pan found that certain rural industrial 
districts "take advantage of the recent open policies to call 
on its extensive expatriate population to contribute mon~y, 
resources, and management skills to its rural development. 
In the Maoist period, such external kinship relations were 
regarded as a source of corrupting influences, although 
remittances from overseas were never interrupted". Now the 
overseas kin investment and the capital from expatriates was 
highly prized by the Chinese leadership to develop China 
township enterprises (Cooper & Pan 1992:139-40). On the 
other hand, Hong Kong and Macau also actively responded to 
the ethnicity propaganda of China chiefly for their own 
business benefits. 
However, the Mainland policy itself also changed with 
its further economic development in 1990s. The open economic 
areas almost stretched to everywhere along the Mainland 
coastal regions after 1988. And now the preferrential tariff 
or other flexible measures might be used to favor those 
investing in the inland provinces. The multinational 
corporations invested by non-Chinese, were now in many 
respects, entitled to the same terms as those overseas 
Chinese used to receive. Or the special favors once enjoyed 
by the Chinese diaspora were now cancelled step by step to 
meet the demands of global market operation and international 
investment standardization. So will the issue of ethnicity, 
economy and polity dwindle away to an oblivion ending? 
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According to the investigation of Nomura Research 
Institute in Japan, the favorite investment sites for Japan 
enterprises in Mainland China nowadays were Shanghai city, 
Zhejiang and Shandong Provinces. They intentionally avoided 
the four special economic zones of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen 
and Shantou mostly occupied by Taiwanese and other overseas 
Chinese investors. In 1980s, China authorities opened the 
four special economic zones plus Hainan to invite the 
foreign investors. Unlike the ordinary industrial zones in 
other Asian countries, these China economic zones carried 
special political purpose. Their geographically neighboring 
with Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan implied the national 
unification goal. The capital investment and economic 
performance of Japanese merchants in these areas, were far 
behind those of Hongkongese and Taiwanese businesspeople 
(Li 1995:50-2). 
In 1985, . fourteen open cities along the seashore of 
Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta and southern Fujian 
were established. In 1988, Shandong Peninsula and Liaodong 
Peninsula were allocated as economic open areas. Thus far, 
China authorities had almost opened ' its seashore·regions to 
foreign merchants for business activities. Japan therefore, 
comprehensively identified the potential candidate of sound 
industrial growth and economic development. One of the item 
in their consideration list was the areas less occupied by 
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overseas Chinese. In Mainland China, the overseas Chinese 
enterprises seldom cooperated with Japanese enterprises. They 
generally competed with each other. The labor cost in the 
Pearl River Delta of Guangdong Province was raised by many 
Hong Kong Chinese. Its merits for labor-intensive industries 
dwindled. Similarly, too many Taiwan small-medium enterprises 
rushed into Fujian also diminished the business opportunities 
for Japanese merchants there. However, the infrastructure 
construction, industrial outputs and consuming standards of 
Shanghai, Zhejiang and Shandong grew at a high speed. They 
thus fell into the favorite list for investment environment 
(Li 1995:51-2). 
Min Shi pointed out the potential Yellow-Bohai Sea 
Economic Sphere forming in the recent stage. It "comprises 
of the western parts of North and South Korea on the Korean 
peninsula, the Chinese Mainland's 4 provinces and 3 cities 
along the coast of the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Sea, and 
Kyushu of Japan". Within the constituents of this sphere, the 
"economic and cultural interchanges are much inconvenienced 
by the national and language impediments". Yet, "it has a 
fairly developed economy, pretty rich resources and high- and 
low-grade products of all sorts" (Shi 1995:23-4): This 
economic zone also created favorable conditions for Japan to 
augment its ties with this area. 
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2.2 The Entry Mode of Taiwanese Investors 
Al t h 0 u g h he a cc e p t e d the Con f u cia n - d e r i v e d e t hi c s a n'd 
values toward work, family, and organizational authority as 
comparative advantages for modern Asian capitalism, Michael 
Hsiao emphasized the relations between political institutions 
and economic performance (Hsiao 1988). Hsiao highlighted the 
uniqueness of East Asian development model in terms of the 
favorable world system timing, institutional factors and 
cultural-psychological forces. He saw that the Confucianist 
moral definition of the state enabled East Asian nations like 
Taiwan "to mobilize resources more autonomously, without 
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being confronted with too much opposition from various sectors 
of the society" (Hsiao 1988:18). The power of growth-committed 
hard political leadership encountered little challenge on its 
export-led manufacturing policy and rapid modernization of 
Taiwan in the past two decades actually. And the small 
family firms happened to constitute the largest part of those 
labor-intensive as well as export-oriented industrialists. 
Michael Hsiao's deep concern for socio-political 
development of local history revealed in his more recent 
research on Taiwan-Mainland economic nexus (Hsiad & So 1994). 
He took a notice on the labor-intensive industries of Taiwan's 
small businessmen "solving their immediate and increasingly 
desperate problems in the early 1980s" by relocation to 
Fujian, Guangdong and other coastal provinces of the Mainland. 
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In Taiwan, these small merchants seldom had a say in the 
strong authoritarian state and could hardly "secure assistance 
from the public banking system" for their export business. 
With "the keen competition and the protectionism in world 
market since 1980s", Taiwan industrialists also faced their 
own problems domestically such as labor shortage and rising 
cost of wages, limited land and high rent, soaring voice of 
censure on the adverse impact of export-led manufacturing 
upon environment, etc. The policies adopted by government to 
deal with such problems were "industrial restructuring, the 
diversification of trade, and relocation to Southeast Asia". 
They did not prove themselves "a workable and effective 
remedy" for these petty businessmen's immediate future. The 
small merchants therefore, "had to rely upon their own 
efforts to survive, for example, turning to traditional 
business practices, informal money markets, and 'self-
exploitation' of themselves and their families in order to 
stay in business" (Hsiao & So 1994:4-5). But why did most of 
the small businessmen choose Mainland China instead of 
Southeast Asia to find a way out? 
The economic and political control of factory workers 
could reveal in Taiwan government-b~siness relationship 
before 1980s. With the martial law coercion and world market 
uncertainty, Taiwan workers suffered from the social 
consequences of a lack of union representation like the 
suppression of workers' grievances as well as the ineffective 
enforcement of labor regulations. Such authoritarian state 
rule that largely deprived those factory workers of social 
welfare was unduly used for the functioning of domestic 
industrial investment. On the other hand, running small 
business was deemed as the main channel of social mobility 
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and factory work was used as an entrepreneurial strategy to 
achieve such an end. "The prevalence of small factories in 
Taiwan, and the ease of setting them up, encourages both poor 
working conditions and the toleration of those conditions by 
workers who aspire to be entrepreneurs" (Stites 1985:242). 
However, the wide-spread education and opulent living standard 
caused the serious domestic labor shortage and the ensuing 
high wages since 1980s. The numerous small entrepreneurs 
earning the marginal profit in the commercial society filled 
with competition relocated their industrial sites mostly 
either to Southeast Asia or Mainland China to solve their 
immediate labor problems and perpetuate their family-based 
enterprises. 
Those small Taiwan enterprisers took the best advantage 
of China policy to promote the ethnic identity and overseas 
investment. As Michael Hsiao and Alvin So put it, "In general, 
Mainland government officials appeared to be more comfortable 
dealing with Taiwanese than with Americans and Japanese. This 
may be because both Mainlander and Taiwanese are Chinese, 
sharing similar customs, habits, language, and other cultural 
traits such as a 'Chinese' way of doing business. Furthermore, 
Mainland officials have been more flexible in such matters as 
labor practices, foreign currency policies, and tariffs in 
dealing with their Taiwan compatriots because these favors 
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can be rationalized through appeals for national unification" 
(Hsiao & So 1994:8). Yet, how did those Taiwan merchants 
respond to the ethnicity and foreign investment policy to run 
their business? In the following case studies we will see some 
of them rejuvenating their declining small family or non-family 
enterprises by this opportunity. Their commercial success was 
also related to the support of their family members. 
I heard many daily happenings from some friends working 
for Taiwan small family or non-family enterprises in the 
Mainland. One was in an umbrella factory in Shenzhen, one in 
a plastic cloth plant in Shantou, one in a porcelain enamel 
plant in Dongguan, and the other in a shoeparts factory in 
Fuzhou. All these Taiwan staffs pointed out that transportation 
was the most important item for their bosses who were engaging 
themselves in export-oriented manufacturing industries, to 
select the southern coastal areas as their investment sites. 
These regions also appealed to them with low labor cost and 
certain tax breaks. Unlike the large-scale enterprise new 
corners aiming at the import potenti~l China market, these 
small-sized manufacturers came early in 1980s simply to save 
their declining export-led business and perpetuate their 
family firms in Taiwan. The friend working for a shoe parts 
company told me that the widespread high education standard 
and the ensuing socio-political democratization made it 
difficult to manage the workers in Taiwan. In the Mainland, 
you could be carefree about this for the time being. Mainland 
workers would not pose so many opinions against your policy 
when you imposed an industrial strategy. Did he suggest that 
the merits of flexibility and informality once attached to 
the employer-employee relationships in the past few decades 
dwindled away with the advancement of Taiwan democratization 
beginning in the 1980s? 
When I visited the Xianglu Fibers plant in Xiamen, one 
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of its Taiwanese managers responsible for study and development 
told me that it was rather for the acceptable infrastructure 
and convenient transportation made them invest here. Xianglu 
was located in the Haicang industrial zone. Originally this 
zone was carefully planned by China government to invite the 
largest Formosa plastics enterpriser Yung-ching Wang to come. 
Wang and Shao-liang Lin were old family friends. Lin had 
already made a good real estate business in northern and 
western Fujian. He encouraged Wang also set his business in 
southern Fujian. Unfortunately, Wang was too famous to come 
in a period that illegal trade with the Mainland was banned 
in Taiwan. The politically aggressive Xiamen City government 
had no choice but to yield this reserved zone to another 
group. Lin was now one of the major share holders of Xianglu. 
In addition to the Xiamen plant, this Indonesia overseas 
Chinese tycoon "undertook a plot of land as large as 50sq km 
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with the consent of Fuzhou authorities" (Yeung & Chu 1995:20). 
For Taiwanese entrepreneurs in Mainland China, the 
uncertainty came not only from the Mainland market itself, 
but also from the government policies of Taiwan and Mainland 
authorities. With the strong disagreement between the two 
entities on political and social affairs, the increasing 
Taiwan capital involvements in the Mainland led to a de facto 
splitting of economic arrangement into two parts -- rational 
and irrational. In spite of the fact that the Mainland was 
politically ambitious, some factors rooted in socio-cultural 
reality and other realistic considerations still made many 
Taiwanese merchants preferred to invest in China than in 
other countries. For those intending to avoid the uncertainty 
of political policies against their business careers, one of 
the good alternatives could be choosing sole ownership free 
from the Mainland partners' managerial intervention and 
conflict over sharing proprietary assets. Of course, it 
might not be the best way, but many businesspeople selected 




Cultural Identity and Business Behavior of the Taiwanese 
Businesspeople in Mainland China 
This Chapter mainly reviews certain Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs in the Mainland and the relevant case studies 
on their identities towards traditional Chinese culture and 
business activities. As mentioned in Chapter 1, being 
Chinese carried the meaning of ethnic identity or the 
historical contexts of cultural identity. It could be an 
unseen power ruling the the capital involvements of those 
Chinese diasporas in Mainland China. Ethnicity and cultural 
identity helped to explain the increasing numbers of 
Taiwanese merchants and their business activities in the 
Mainland. Cultural identity was kind of particular cultural 
forms used by people to distinguish between themselves and 
others. The organization and conceptual base of a group 
identity could be found in many cultural forms. It was a 
product of historical development. This cultural identity 
might be based on the sources of co-tradition in Chinese 
societies, like socio-linguistic, religious or philosophical 
roots. And its relation with the business behaviors of 
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Taiwanese entrepreneurs in the Mainland should be placed 
under a careful review. Usually the interviewees provided me 
quite a few alternatives to appreciate the same problem. It 
was received with unanimity that language as an important 
ingredient in the common culture of Taiwan and China helped 
them do business in the Mainland. Some of them also regarded 
the popular religion and food culture as the significant 
continuity of traditional values and habits that influenced 
their investments in Mainland China. Most of them saw guanxi 
(i.e. personal connections) as a cultural factor of great 
importance to do business in the Mainland. Also the 
relationship between personal connections and economic 
performance was generally deemed as the most sophisticated 
part in all. 
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According to a questionnaire survey conducted by the 
scholars of the Business Administration Council in Taipei, 
smaller Taiwan enterprises depended more on easy communication 
due to similar language and ethnicity than bigger ones did 
to set their business in motion (Hsiao & So 1994:9). They 
tended to choose Fujian and other southern coastal provinces 
as their investment sites. Such enterprises of this very 
area also depended more on personal connections than those 
of other regions did to achieve their business success 
(Chiu, etc. 1994:129,151). I took several field trips 
to the industrial areas in Fujian and other provinces of the 
Mainland to investigate the dialect ' group identi~y as well as 
guanxi problems, and to what extent the familiar language 
and the rule of relationships predisposed those businessmen 
to associate themselves with the investment environment. 
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In his study of emergence of a Taiwanese popular culture, 
Joseph Bosco saw that "identity must take a cultural form; 
persons adopt behavior, symbols, and rituals that allow 
identity to be recognized. The emerging Taiwanese popular 
culture is noticeable in ... language, religion, and the arts 
and entertainment" (Bosco 1992:54). I went to Xiamen, the 
place from which most portion of Taiwanese popular culture 
was derived. On the way from the airport to the hotel, I 
listened to the talkative taxi driver. He said, "You Taiwanese 
came here either for doing business or making your pilgrimage 
to Matsu temple. I estimated that 30,000 Taiwanese had 
populated Xiamen. I could even name the stores run by 
Taiwanese along the streets for you. One other possibility 
to make you come was visiting your ancestral homes to let 
them know that you had prospered in Taiwan, right?". I had 
no comment on this. Strolling about through the market later 
on, I sighted the peddling stand selling Taiwanese incense. 
Impressed with the people with exactly the same Taiwanese 
language and similar features here, I was immersed in my 
question while eating the familiar Amoy cuisines. How did 
such sense of cultural loyalty paid to ancestral homes might 
contribute to the hot business dialogues between Taiwanese 
merchants and their Chinese counterparts in the Mainland? 
Beseiged with the problems of high-priced land and labor 
shortage, quite a few Taiwanese merchants visited Fujian, 
especially Xiamen, to find a way to invest with their limited 
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capital. Was it possible that they felt culturally comfortable 
to choose a place similar to their hometown in Taiwan in many 
ways to invest? Common language, popular religion and food 
culture could serve as kind of cultural forms to examine the 
identity of Taiwanese merchants and their business activities 
in Mainland China as follows. 
3.1 Special Economic Zones and Dialect Group Identity 
Language as an efficient communicating tool might 
develop a feeling of intimacy, establish a complex of group 
belonging, and further arose sorts of cooperative spirits. 
In my first field trip from Beijing to Xiamen, I had a 
cordial conversation with a Singaporean sharing the mother 
tongue with me. He was on the tour way to Quanzhou in 
Fujian, his ancestral home. I even made friends with a 
Chinese couple from Malaysia while sitting at the lobby 
bench of the hotel in Xiamen. Our distance was bridged by 
the Minnan dialect. They had just come back from a visit at 
the home of their relatives in Yongchun which was not far 
away from here. We talked much about the same daily religious 
practices in Maylasia and Taiwan and the Gods we worshipped 
before they rushed to catch their tour bus. Lau-fong Mak 
observed that dialect group identity played a central role 
in bringing harmony for an open as well as highly developed 
organization in the Chinese society. It broke the encumbrance 
to communication and facilitated the profitable trade unions 
for the overseas Chinese in the host society (Mak 1985:182-5). 
First of all, dialect group identity might have fallen 
into the consideration list of the Chinese authorities 
concerned in designing the Special Economic Zones. Hong Kong 
investors might find their business trips not so rewarding in 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai of Guangdong Province if Cantonese was 
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not spoken there. Ezra Vogel reviewed the political and 
economic reform of Guangdong in the One Step Ahead in China, 
and discussed its business relations with Hong Kong. At the 
end of the book, Vogel also included the cases of Taiwan and 
South Korea in his remark about their investments in Mainland. 
"For Taiwan the major potential partner was 
spoke Taiwan's Fujianese dialect ... Korean 
Fujian, which 
showed greater 
long-range interest in Shandong and north China, which are 
located near Korea and contain Korean-speaking minorities" 
(Vogel 1989:448). 
As to the development corridor in Fujian, Yue-man Yeung 
and David Chu indicated that "being the capital city of the 
province, Fuzhou was not granted the open city status until 
1984. Its bureauracy, its own dialect (which is different 
from the Minnan dialect spoken by 80% of the Taiwanese), its 
geographical position and so on made it less favourable to 
attracting foreign investment in comparison with Xiamen" 
(Yeung & Chu 1995:20). According to Charng Kao, the scholar 
of Chung-Hua Institute of Economic Research, it was reasonable 
to take the dialect factor into consideration.Hl The skilled 
labors or technicians constituted most of the early Taiwan 
investors in Xi amen during the 1980s. Some of these petty 
factory owners ranking from machine repairmen did not receive 
much school education. They could not even speak fluent 
Mandarin. The region using the dialect same as their daily 
language could definitely make a cordial business environment 
for them. 
In the conversation with one of my informants doing 
business in the Mainland, I learned that it was for dialect 
group identity for him to make the inv~stment decision. He 
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was afraid that the executives and workers in Southeast Asia 
might not be fully instructed in his words. The persons in the 
Mainland shared a common language with him, and that saved him 
from learning another language before starting his business. 
Someone might argue that the communication gap related with 
language differences could be filled in another manner. In 
his case studies on the recent Taiwanese investment in 
Beijing and Xiamen, Keun Lee posed a critical point. He saw 
that "(c)omparing China with Southeast Asia as an investment 
site for Taiwanese capital, language difference is not a 
problem in either area because overseas Chinese are widespread 
in Southeast Asia; for instance, about 30 percent of the total 
population in Malaysia are overseas Chinese. Most Taiwanese 
investment in Southeast Asia is linked with local overseas 
Chinese" (Lee 1993:186). The wage cost and tax rate should 
be more telling for the investment outcome. But, we could 
still find a fact from the comparison list of Keun Lee to 
further elaborate our language prob~em analysis. 
Obviously, Southeast Asia countries outshone China in 
terms of financial institutions and credit availability as 
well as investment-related legislation and its enforcement 
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(Lee 1993:187). These strong points attracted more large-scale 
Taiwan enterprises instead of small ones to invest in Southeast 
Asia (Yu & Yeh 1994:42). In addition to the socio-politic~l 
and economic reasons, we could also find some cultural 
ingredients associated with language differences to account 
for this unbecoming result. For example, Tungtex, the 
renowned Taiwan related enterprise, held a large business 
networks in both Southeast Asia and Mainland China. They 
manufactured different products in the respective areas. In 
a seminar, the chairman of this multi-national corporation 
Yu-how Chen compared the advantages and drawbacks between 
the investment environment of the two regions (Chen 1995). 
His apt remark based on his personal experience shed a light 
on my empirical studies. 
Despite the fact that Mainland China, comparatively 
speaking, lacked a sound legal framework for foreign 
enterprises to gain the loan from local financial institutions 
as needed and thus badly impaired the normal exercise and 
growth of their organizations, this chairman saw that the 
small entrepreneurs' preferring to invest in China than in 
Southeast Asian countries was still understandable. Beseiged 
with the problems of high-priced land and labor ~hortage, 
quite a few Taiwan businesspeople visited the Mainland to 
find a way out with their limited capital. On the one hand, 
most of the out-migrated small scale enterprises were labor 
intensive and export oriented, they depended not so much on 
lending and loan as those large scale enterprises seeking 
the import markets in Mainland China did. On the other hand, 
the relatively easier adaptation for sharing common language 
and custom with their counterparts in the Mainland could 
further lend probability for them to invest in China (Chen 
1995:103-8). 
When I visited a mini-spring manufacturing factory in 
Xiamen, the van driver told me that his Taiwanese boss 
chose here as the factory site for the weather similar to 
that of his hometown. My enounter with a local Xiamen 
inhabitant Mr. Chang working for a large Taiwan tea leaf 
corporation rendered an even clearer picture for this notion. 
This manager invited me to have a tour at his company. He 
showed me the photographs of their tea leaf fields on the 
mountainside and the staff dormitories. The altitude and 
climate of the field location were excellent for Taiwan tea 
leaf breed Oolong. 
However, the son of the Taiwan mini-spring factory 
owner Mr. Tsai also stressed that his father just could not 
stand any language beyond his comprehension. Mr. Chang told 
me, "although lots of migrant workers from neigh~oring 
provinces were hired, my boss only used staffs from his 
Taiwan firm and Xiamen locals as high level administrators". 
According to his explanation, a common language and similar 
outlook alone would not enable the Taiwanese in Fujian to 
40 
easily give and assimilate values. They were seldom well 
prepared with the economic, political or social systems 
somewhat different from theirs in Taiwan. Thanks to the 
sophisticated knowledge of the Xiamen locals, these local 
managers could explain to them the key points and make 
things work out. They were generally well educated, but were 
easily attracted by the fat jobs in more open city like 
Shenzhen. Anyway, the population of Xiamen itself constituted 
.a valuable human resource. His comment involved a profound 
problem of language, ideology and power. Through Bourdieu's 
linguistic approach, these managers could be seen as agents 
holding the symbolic capital not only in the practical 
speech competency, but also in the capacity to deal with the 
social interactions problem and interpret the meaning of 
linguistic expression in accordance with certain concepts of 
propriety and the situtational needs (Thompson 1984:64). 
With the knowledge of Xiamen affairs, they helped Taiwanese 
merchants dovetail into the local institutional orders and 
facilitated "the relations of domination which ideology 
serves to sustain" while playing their communication role 
(Thompson 1984:66). 
Obviously, the dialect group identity had o~curred to 
the Chinese authorities concerned in their planning of 
southern coast economic development. And the small Taishang 
depended more on this cultural factor than the big ones did 
to work out their business operation in Mainland China. 
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2.2 Religious Connections 
As I mentioned before, the taxi driver took me as a 
Taiwanese believing in Matzu, the Goddess of Sea. Judging 
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from the great number of the pious Matzu believers in Taiwan, 
his conjecture was not without factual support. I also sighted 
the peddling stand selling Taiwanese incense. That raised 
another question for me to think over in the domain of 
business and popular religion. In Taiwan, people usually 
prepared the daily incense, candles and materials for altar 
in honor of their dieties and ancestors. Businesspeople paid 
special attention to the offerings presented to the God of 
Earth on the First and Fifteenth of every month (i.e. 
according to lunar calendar). They contiune this practice in 
Xiamen. 
Meizhou island of Putian County in Fujian was the 
birthplace of Matzu (i.e. Tianhou). Even away from their 
ancestral places, those properous overseas businessmen 
mostly from Fujian were greatly reassured by the Matzu 
belief in the course of their efforts. Many of them made 
their fortunes in Taiwan and Southeast Asia on the strength 
of this religion to pray for the well-being and the power to 
beat the trouble. Their belief never dwindled with the 
passage of time. Based on the Matzu belief and the spirit of 
Chinese capitalism, Wou Wei regarded that there existed a 
close relationship between Matzu belief and the wealth 
accumulation of overseas Chinese (Wei 1995). 
Before the home visit movement was allowed in 1987, -
numerous Matzu believers had already headed from Taiwan to 
pay their pilgrimage in Meizhou. These Taiwan residents 
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might not have relatives or connections there after centuries 
of seperation from Mainland. However, their cultural loyalty 
paid to the ancestral homes was well represented in this 
religious voyage. The China authorities thus privileged the 
prigrims from a 72 hours transit visa to serve the convenience 
demands of these earnest visitors arriving in fishing boats, 
and to boost their consumption as well as religious donation 
there. With this cultural affinity plus the good condition 
to make a natural habor, Meizhou Bay should become an ideal 
industrial area for Taiwan merchants to invest. Kai-en Ting, 
the chairman of Taiwan Commerce Promotion Council in 
Hong Kong, believed that the Meizhou Bay could become the 
most promising place to bridge the people of the two sides 
of Taiwan Strait by means of cultural exchange and economic 
cooperation. He assessed its criteria from the viewpoints of 
historical development and geographical position to justify 
his proposition (Ting 1993:62-5). 
Now the tourist business of Putian County was booming 
indeed. There were about 100,000 overseas Chinese from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Southeast Asia to visit the Matzu Temple every 
year. Besides, this harbor city was emerging from the 
cultivation of salt fields, aquaculture, fishery and 
agricultural product like bamboo under the deliberative 
planning of its city government in recent years (Wang & Lin 
1995:77-8). Yue-man Yeung and David Chu studied the factor 
that favours Meizhou Bay for development. They noticed its 
close linguistic and ethnic affinity to Taiwan. "In addition, 
there is an additional bond between the people in Meizhou Bay 
and Taiwan in their common religious faith in the Goddess of 
the Sea (Tianhou)" (Yeung & Chu 1995: 32). Tianhou Temple in 
Meizhou Island is also a great asset capable of developing 
into a major tourist destination, complemented by value-added 
food industries (Yeung & Chu 1995:34). 
I once discussed with a Taiwanese merchant Mr. Tseng 
who had been doing business in Meizhou since one decade ago. 
He immediately discouraged me from further studying this 
religious issue. "Such a fragile cultural identity based on 
popular religion should not be extended to the business 
strategies any more", he stated. "Don't you remember that 
southern Fujian had been the battlefield decades ago when 
Taiwan and the Mainland was at war? How could it possible 
that sound facilities were under construction in a period of 
conflict of arms? Its infrastructure fell behind ~those of 
the early open cities or economic areas. Even its recent 
economic reform had improved a lot, there left much to be 
desired. Business is business. If you wanted the markets or 
resources, it was a must to go northward. Shanghai or 
44 
northeast provinces would suit the investors much better". 
Mr. Tseng deemed his personal experience in Meizhou was 
mediocre. Ten years ago he imported ginseng from the 
northeast provinces to Meizhou to find a market among 
the Taiwan pilgrims. Ginseng was cherished as kind of dear 
medicinal material then. Most of the clients were farmers 
and laborers who believed it a panacea and were willing to 
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buy it in their travels. Nevertheless, ginseng was now widely 
circulated in the stand peddlers of the city night markets 
during the period of drastic open reform policy these years. 
Its easy availability made his business earn less profit. 
Through the eyes of this merchant, Meizhou and its neighboring 
regions should not be listed in the priority consideration 
for investing places. 
China authorities never gave up the opportunities to 
pull the social relations with Taiwanese by using this 
popular religious belief. We could find many newly published 
academic journals to serve the Fujian local trade and economic 
promotion like New Asia Commerce and The Investigation and 
Research of the Xiamen Special Economic Zone in Xiamen or 
Open Tide in Fuzhou. Readers might ~asily catch the religious 
rhetoric from those publications such as "Polish up the Matzu 
rhetoric to extend the exchange activities with Taiwan. 
Putian County was the birthplace of Matzu culture. There 
were 14 million Matzu believers in Taiwan. Matzu culture 
carried an influential weight in Taiwan" (Sheu & Wu 1995:30). 
"Try hard to promote the economic and commerce organizations 
and -actively attract the Taiwan capital investment by 
combining the persuasive activities like Matsu inspection 
trips" (Chern 1995:31-2). 
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Of course, Taiwanese merchants were not totally apathetic 
to the booming religious propaganda. But, from my observation 
more often than not they treated their business and religious 
affection domains separately. Realistic merchants scarcely 
took the birthplace of Matzu into their account for investment 
motivation unless its infrastructure was largely enhanced to 
meet the physical facility standard. In the progress to 
their business success, men consulted their religious belief 
to overcome the problem of uncontrollable reality. I 
frequently came across the believers at the temples to ask 
their fortunes by casting of two kidney-shaped divination 
blocks. But, merchants also had their own faculty of 
rationality. They tried hard to play their own parts at 
the usual time. 
It might be difficult to test the effect of religious 
affiliation on social, political and economic networking 
patterns, or to examine the business deals stemmed from the 
ties of religious connections. Businessmen took the best 
advantage of their reason, experience and skills to bring 
them profits. No matter what cultural practices threw their 
weight upon their decision making, they empolyed the handy 
strategies to achieve their lucrative ends. They could 
hardly plan their business blueprints sheerly on the ground 
of firm religous belief. Concerning the Matzu culture, 
popular religion could serve, at most, as a factor among 
others to reinforce their profitable planning like the 
portion Yeung & Chu (1995:32-4) adding to their enumerative 
analysis. 
The mini-spring factory owner Mr. Tsai kindly invited 
me to his home. I therefore had the chance to enter his 
social space and religious life. Basically, this family 
remained the same ways of living as in Taiwan. They watched 
the Taiwan newspapers subscribed from the Xiamen Office for 
Taiwan Affairs. Their television could also receive Taiwan 
programs. The local maids cooked the dishes with Taiwanese 
flavor for them. His family members observed the traditional 
Taiwanese ways of religious beliefs and practices. He 
arrived in Xiamen to establish his factory in 1989 and felt 
comfortable to realize that Xiamen people shared many common 
worshipping festivals in Taiwan, especially the ceremonial 
practices held on the 1st and 15th of every month. I was 
impressed by the imposing altar and , ancestral tablets 
in his living room. Mr. Tsai told me that all his family 
members moved to Xiamen to work. Even his brother and nephews 
had to look after the plants in Shenzhen. There was no one 
in Taiwan to serve the ancestral tablets for him. The only 
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way to fulfill his duty was establishing the incense table 
here. There was a time when one of his Mainland workers 
stole the offerings from the altar at an event of the 15th 
worshipping. Unlike his lenient father, the boss's daughter 
who was also the real person in charge of this company, was 
angry with this. Miss Tsai severely scolded the worker for 
such a rude behavior to blaspheme the diety. The worker just 
said "In China, when you unduly took something from the 
public, you returned it to the public unit. That was all". 
He did not feel guilty at all. From then on, she recognized 
that she and her Mainland counterparts sometimes held the 
different value systems to assess the same matter. Their 
religious belief of the dieties and the rituals performed 
might appear same in outlook, but different in essence. This 
incident made her reconsider her usual way of supervising 
the factory workers. I will discuss it more in the management 
field of the later chapter. 
It seemed safe to conclude that the religious belief 
and practice of this merchant belonged to his personal life 
domain. He observed his usual way of religious practices to 
fulfill his role as a male descent. He was also in search of 
the grace from Heaven and the blessing from ancestors for his 
family prosperity. Nevertheless, the similar form of popular 
religion in Xiamen could not be counted as the major reason 
for him to make the investment choice. From the two genuine 
cases reviewed in this section, I found it difficult to 
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claim that the business decisions of Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
were influenced to a degree by the cultural identity based 
on their religious affiliation. 
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3.3 Trends of Popular Culture 
The feeling of intimacy caused by the effect of common 
language and dialect group identity could also enter into 
other unnoticed daily business and culture domains. In her 
psycho-linguistic study of the Whorfian Hypothesis based on 
the Japanese passive, Agnes Niyekawa-Howard admitted that 
"if the language has features corresponding to themes present 
in the nonlinguistic aspects of the culture, language is 
likely to reinforce and solidify the perceptual habit induced 
by these nonlinguistic aspects of the culture" (Niyekawa-
Howard 1968:6). In my fieldwork observation in Xiamen, 
certain Taiwan food products or cultural commodities like 
popular music and soap operas were well received by local 
people. The rapid and wide acceptance of these seemingly 
non-linguistic aspects of popular culture and consuming 
habits was favorably influenced by the social implications 
associted with rhetoric. The linguistic expression of the 
Taiwan song lyrics or film scripts might create kind of 
sympathetic vibrations among the Mainlanders. 
When I arrived on Gulangyu, a small island near Xiamen, 
I noticed that all the radios of the peddling stands played 
the Minnan dialect songs of Taiwan singers. And there was a 
time that I dined in a Karaoke restaurant run by Taiwanese. 
After perusing the song menu and stealing a peek around, 
I tried to figure out what really arrested the interests 
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of these persons. It seemed to me that they were moved not 
only by the melody, but also by the words of the songs. 
The lyrics could have a say in their songs selection. 
According to the statistics of a Beijing Television Station 
allowing audiences to pick songs by dialing, it lasted quite 
a period in 1995 that the hit rate always went to the tape of 
Taiwan singer Su Rui's mandarin song Hold Hands. The melody 
of this song was quite simple, but its lyric that told the 
mutual life long spiritual support of a couple was really 
moving. I began to wonder that the local listeners loved the 
songs because they understood the literal meanings of these 
lyrics. 
Then I consulted a lecturer of the Beijing Central 
Conservatory of Music who studied the psychology of music.#2 
He told me that linguistic expression of the lyrics surely 
carried the positive effect to supplement and reinforce the 
right kind of melody of the songs, be it happy or sad. 
Especially when the lines of the lyrics coincided with the 
themes of personal experience or real incidents within living 
memory. Before the Open Policy adopted in the early 1980s, 
the popular culture was rigidly used as a propaganda to 
glorify the collectivist ideal and serve the pub!ic purposes. 
And quite a few Taiwan popular songs were most welcome right 
after the Cultural Revolution Movement because of their warm 
reception allowing individuals to express personal feeling 
without keeping one's passion under discipline. 
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The comment of this music psychologist bore a similar 
nature with Mayfair Yang's explanation for the popularity ' of 
some Taiwan TV serials or films among the Mainlanders. Yang 
saw that the films from Taiwan endeared themselves to the 
general public lay in "their stronger' renqin flavor' (i.e. 
human feelings flavor), and their themes of interpersonal 
emotions that are not subsumed to the higher ends of political 
doctrines, as in most Mainland films" since the Cultural 
Revolution time (Yang 1994:69). Apparently these cultural 
commodities sold well in the Chinese societies cherishing 
social relationships partly because they carried the content 
of human feeling and personal connections. Through the 
linguistic expression, they arosed the familiar feeling they 
had lost quite a bit in the past few decades but never 
forgotten. Now such identity revived through certain kind of 
popular cultural forms. 
Concerning the language and social context, Gary Ferraro 
(1994) pointed that China belonged to a high-context culture 
society. To communicate well in such society, people relied 
heavily on "restricted codes" and "contextual cues such as 
nonverbal behavior, social context, ' and the 'natute of 
interpersonal relationships" (Ferraro 1994:50). Some popular 
brands of Taiwan food products were largely promoted by 
sucessful advertisement programs. The lines presented at the 
commercial broadcasting might demonstrate the excellent 
rhetorical skills of the planners. The Ching Hsiang cooking 
oil could make a good example. The consumers knew the Taiwan 
actress pretty well. She was remembered for the role she 
played in the Stars know my heart, one of the most popular 
Taiwan TV serial in Mainland China (Chen 1994:22-8). In that 
serial, she acted as a great mother struggling with the 
cancer herself to protect her five children after her husband 
died. Though she uttered the plain words in the commercial 
TV presentation, the actress impressed the audiences with 
her intimacy and warmth closely related with their personal 
daily experience. It was easier for the consumers to receive 
the advertising-like behavior through the linguisitic 
expressions filled with human feelings flavor. 
For foreign products to sell well in Mainland China, a 
name adequately rendered in Chinese language was important. 
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In her study of Chinese mind game and inner culture, Chin-ning 
Chu found that the best selling of Coca Cola in the Mainland 
was partially to do with this American corporation' choosing 
a wonderful Chinese name for the product - 'Delight To The 
Mouth And Delight To The Heart' (Chu 1988:241). Randall 
Stross also indicated that "Coca-Cola's Paul Austin was 
delighted to learn that the Chinese ' rendering of.Coca-Cola 
Kekoukele, literally, 'Can-Be-Tasty-Can-Be-Happy'-- conveyed 
the idea of resfreshment ... " (Stross 1990: 268). It was not 
difficult to name more profits benefited from dialect group 
identii for Taiwan food items in Mainland. For instance, it 
was believed that an interesting name as Kang Shih Fu helped 
to sell the instant noodles. Out of psychological reason, 
the ordinary man might be attracted. Probably for his Chinese 
wisdom, he caught the implication of 'health' (rendered by 
Kang) and decent professional title of 'experienced cook' 
(rendered by Shih Fu) (Yazhou Zhoukan 1996 10(2):49). The 
word of Kang Shih Fu delivered a concept easily received by 
the local consumers and sold well especially in the northern 
China. In the local world view of northern China, Shih Fu 
was deemed as a respectful term to call the professionals. 
To sell commodities well in a high-context language 
society through advertisement presentation, the knowing of 
local world views was of equal paramount importance with the 
acquisition of language itself. Yet, it was usually easier 
for Chinese-speaking than non-Chinese-speaking people to 
follow the words beyond the literal meanings and render an 
adequate expression. Taiwanese and other ethnic Chinese 
might benefit from this advantage due to their similarity of 
language and ethnicity with their counterparts in the 
Mainland. 
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3.4 Business of Food Culture 
Food industry in Mainland China is one of the major 
sectors to examine the relationship between business and 
cultural affinity of Taiwanese investors. Taiwanese 
enterprises surpassed other foreign corporations in Mainland 
China chiefly at certain fields of food industry (Shih 1996: 
70-2). People in the Mainland shared the common food culture 
to a high degree with the ethnic Chinese in Taiwan. The 
popularity of certain Taiwan food commodities in the Mainland 
societies indicates the social implications associated with 
the food industry. Taiwanese enterprises add an inventory of 
rich food varieties to the China markets. The psychocultural 
approach will be used to analyze (1) how the Mainlanders 
engage themselves in the consumption of certain Taiwan and 
foreign food items; and (2) how the cultural identity might 
condition their consuming habits and brand selections 
accordingly. 
It might be useful to learn the background knowledge of 
Taiwan investment categories in Southeast Asia and Mainland 
China, the two largest areas to invest overseas. From the 
comparison list, we could find a divergent interest existing 
between the entrepreneurs investing in Mainland China and 
those in Southeast Asia. Their common investment items in 
the respective region only confined in the fields of electric 
machinery, electric appliances, base metals and articles of 
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base metal, chemical products, and textiles. And their salient 
difference revealed in many other fields. The investors in 
Mainland China showed additional interest in precision 
instruments and apparatus, plastics and articles thereof as 
well as food and beverage industries. On the other hand, the 
businessmen investing in the Southeast Asia exhibited 
preference in non-metal and mineral products, articles of 
paper pulp as well as rubber and articles thereof (Yu & Yeh 
1994:208). 
From the categories chosen based on the entrepreneurs' 
actual consideration, we might argue that the cheap labor and 
tax breaks could help generate the common investment items 
because both the Mainland China and Southeast Asia owned the 
two merits. But, the bountiful natural resources of Southeast 
Asia, and the relatively more professional workers as well as 
potentially huge market of Mainland China could induce a 
divergent interest in the investment categories list. The 
potentially huge market of Mainland might give rise to the 
Taiwan food and beverage industries in China instead of 
Southeast Asia. According to Wei Shih, a journalist of the 
China Market, food industry was now escalating to top 3 
industries on the list of Taiwan investment items in Mainland 
China, only second to the manufacturing industries of 
electrical machinery and electrical appliances. The investment 
capital was estimated to be US$610,000,000 in the first half 
of 1996 (Shih 1996:70). And Taiwan restaurants in the Mainland 
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had also achieved their business success to a degree (Lu 1994; 
Liang 1994; Chen 1996b). 
I gained some ideas from two successful restaurants run 
by Taiwanese in Xiamen. First example comes from a Mongolian 
barbecue restaurant and the second a hotel restaurant. I was 
able to observe their management. Both the managers of the 
restaurants stressed the importance of combining the food 
with quality service. Their food was well received by the 
local consumers based on two reasons. It not only suited 
the taste of the local society, but also satisfied the 
psychological pleasure of the local consumers. 
The buffet meal of that Mongolian barbecue restaurant 
contained Mongolian barbecue meat, seafood, chafing dish, 
steaks, fruit bar, salad bar, scraped ice and drinks. Clients 
might serve themselves several rounds till they felt full at 
a fixed price (i.e. 58 RMB). Such a dish menu and charging 
arrangement was not unfamiliar in Taiwan. They transplanted 
the authentic management style of their Taiwan chain stores 
to establish their 106th store in Xiamen. They kept the 
identical store name and trademark. Even the music tapes 
played here were all the popular Taiwan Minnan dialect songs 
and some Mandarine songs of Teresa Li Chun Teng. I could name 
all these original Taiwan singers. It was hard to find an 
empty seat in this hall having a capacity of 200 guests. 
There were about 15 waiters and waitresses mostly from the 
neighboring provinces. About 10 staffs did the paperworks 
and public relations in the office upstairs. Five of them 
including the president were from Taiwan. The others were 
Xiamen locals. 
The success of the business seemed to have lots to do 
with the identity of the local dishes and the same taste 
between Xiamen and Taiwan. But the owner of the Mongolian 
restaurant Mr. Wang saw this only telling part of the story. 
Conventional culture could be an important factor. However, 
he believed that the clients were largely attracted by the 
reasonal price they could afford and the rich varieties of 
the dishes. Among others, the eating style was special to 
them. The clients were not only Xiaman locals, but also a 
lot from other places working in Xiamen. Mr. Wang also humbly 
told me that his store was booming in Xiamen partly because 
it was not an advanced city like Shanghai. Quite a few people 
here were illiterates. He did not think the taste of this 
restaurant capable of attracting those highly educated and 
westernized guests in Shanghai. Hai Pa Wang, a famous Taiwan 
seafood chafing dish restaurant, for example, could not 
appeal to the long-term clients in Shanghai because of the 
limited variety in dishes arrangement. 
The manager of a hotal restaurant Mr. Huang treated me 
the Hong Kong style drinking tea with refreshments. From the 
seats filled to full capacity, I could tell that the food 
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here endeared itself to the local residents. The dishes 
might not be so authentically delicate as those in Hong Kong, 
but Mr. Huang believed that the taste of the 'people' he 
served should be placed into the first priority. He did not 
mind tailoring the original recipe of the authentic Cantonese 
cuisine to cater for the Xiamen local customers. It seemed 
to be a fashion having breakfast in this stylish restaurant 
with families or friends. Relatively speaking, the price of 
these Hong Kong cuisines here was more expensive than those 
of many other eating houses in this region. But, this 
Taiwanese manager told me that people would rather be 
respected and served well even though they had to pay a 
little more price for this quality service. 
We might learn some lessons from the two cases to 
explore the potentials of Taiwan food industries in the China 
market. Both the two persons in charge of the practical 
management caught our attention to the following phenomena. 
The food selection and consumption of the local residents 
was beyond the biologically imperative consideration. They 
seriously fathomed the degree to which the local consumers 
could afford. But, they supposed that consumers would not 
mind spending a little more money t~ persue a sp~cial feeling 
like the metropolitan style of Hong Kong tea drinking or the 
new wave of Taiwan buffet meals plus chafing dishes. They 
treated their food selection and consumption behaviors as 
kind of socio-cultural representation. They could serve 
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the food that carried prestige and induced the changing 
psychological states of the local residents. 
There were two opposite forces in operation to shape the 
fashion of popular food culture. On the one hand, adaptation 
was recognized as a significant factor to cater for the taste 
of the local consumers. The owner of the barbecue restaurant 
thus keenly grasped the homogeneity of Amoy and Taiwanese 
cuisines to take Xiamen as his investing spot. The popular 
songs played in the store were those acceptable to the local 
residents in terms of the linguistic expression of the lyrics 
and the melody of Minnan music. It might be easy to adapt the 
recipe of their Taiwan chain stores to suit the flavor of 
this host community. Even the hotel restaurant manager 
realized the benefit of integrating their food items into 
the taste of Fujianese by tailoring the Cantonese cuisines. 
On the other hand, both of them were evidently aware 
that the force of distinction was important to make themselves 
differnt from others in fashion modes. The local people felt 
that food consumption in those restaurants could reflect 
their social status and cultural identification towards a 
different living way deriving from Hong Kong or Taiwan. So 
the two bosses never forgot to emphasize the metropolitan 
and stylish characteristics of their food items plus eating 
habits from Hong Kong or Taiwan. 
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Many social scientists studying the psychology of 
Chinese people regarded that Chinese societies valued highly 
the 'face culture' (Bond 1986:243-9; King 1992:41-63). In 
analyzing the Chinese family business form of organization, 
Gordon Redding also sensed that the intimate relationship 
between face and values for supporting the group structure 
could be traceable in the psycho-social legacy of China 
(Redding 1990:63). Face stood for kind of prestige that 
people found themselves ill affording to lose. They tried 
hard to maintain their face in every aspect of their social 
lives. Such a cultural belief could certainly regulate their 
choosing behaviors congenial to their status and reputation. 
If the food selection could help the consumers secure sort 
of social prestige, food consumption must have involved a 
process of face-work. Consumers themselves might use their 
food intake to perceive their place alongside others. In 
addition to adaptation, we therefore could not ignore the 
importance of distinction force in shaping popular food 
culture. These two factors should be taken into our assessing 
the investment of Taiwan food industries in the China market 
which will be discussed later. 
In his case study on Cantonese , cuisine, Taiwanese 
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cuisine and the emergence of Taiwan identity, David Y.R. Wu 
hypothesized that Taiwanese and Cantonese cuisines might 
positively involve in the creation of a modern Taiwan 
identity.H3 Ethnic pride and consciousness could be revealed 
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from the hierarchically ordered food habit and eating taste. 
The newly emerging political Taiwan identity noticeably 
reflected in the Taiwanese popular food culture these days. 
David Wu analyzed the reciprocal relationship of Taiwanese 
cuisine and identity through the dishes served in the eating 
houses and classy restaurants. He regarded that the types of 
popular dishes could be correlated with the social judgement 
towards status and prestige. So the food selection and 
consumption might properly exhibit the ethos of certain 
society. His findings might also be used to develop our 
further discussion on the connections between the food 
consumption and cultural identity in another Chinese societies. 
Wu's theory could be illustrated with the examples from 
the report on the trend of Mainland China restaurant and 
food culture by Liang Liang (Liang 1994). The Cantonese 
cuisine of Hong Kong had distinguished itself from that of 
Guangdong Province by the end of 1970s. The former differed 
from the latter in that it absorbed many strong points of 
foreign cuisines and placed additional, emphasis on fresh 
seafood and original flavor of broth. During the late period 
of 1980s in Mainland China, the official and private dinner 
parties were frequently held in those Hong Kong restaurants. 
People took it as a great honor and a symbol of superior 
status to gather and throw banquets there (Liang 1994:64-5). 
The 1980s saw a trend toward multi-cultural cuisine. In 
Mainland China, American corporations like McDonald and 
Kentucky tremendously satisfied young people's psychology of 
fast food happiness. The famous Hong Kong fast food 
chainstores like Cafe de Coral and Fairwood were popular 
too. There were also numerous decent restaurants under the 
name of Taiwanese cuisine and convenient eating houses 
serving Taiwan stew beef noodles or lunch boxes appearing in 
Beijing and Shanghai (Liang 1994:68-9; Lu 1994:76-80; Ch en 
1996b). These investors used the unique Taiwan dish flavor 
and the special decoration of the restaurant settings with a 
mnemonic store name deliberately designed to give relish to 
the meals. In Taiwan, the new ferver for Taiwanese cuisine 
could be seen as a phenomenon telling the identity towards 
local culture. It was a native effort to transform into the 
unorthodox cosmopolitanism free from the authority of the 
central government as David Wu suggested. But, under the 
selling strategy planning of Taiwanese merchants in Mainland 
China, Taiwan food items caused a different interpretation 
of cultural identify among the Mainland residents to whet 
their consuming appetite. 
Mainlanders showed great preference toward foreign 
products and believed the advertisement broadcasting. It was 
interesting to note that the sales of Taiwan Beer was two 
times as large as that of Tsingtao Beer in the Mainland. The 
former brand surpassed the latter one in selling amount 
partly because the local residents were attracted by the 
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advertisement lines accentuating that it was from Taiwan. 
Yet, Taiwan businessmen themselves mostly consumed old famous 
Tsingtao Beer produced in Shandong Province (Chen 1995:116). 
In Mainland China, foreign enterprises boosted the price of 
instant noodle. But instant noodle still became the major 
food item in breakfast, picnicking, business trips nowadays. 
Contrary to the practice using it as an emergency substitute 
in Taiwan, Mainlanders deemed the consuming of instant 
noodle as an eating habit that added to their 'face' or 
enhanced their prestige (Yazhou Zhoukan 1996 10(2):50). 
According to the statistics quoted from Beijing and 
Shanghai, Wei Shih indicated that the top brands of instant 
noodles all went to Taiwan enterprises in terms of the 
selling amount and the reputation survey conducted among the 
Mainland consumers (Shih 1996:71-2). Of course, this 
coincidence might be easily explained by the relatively 
homogeneous food culture of the two regions. It was generally 
supposed that Taiwan food and drink companies kept the 
business booming to a miracle in Mainland chiefly owing to 
the homegeneity of their eating habits (Kung Shang Shih Pao 
1994:2-23,148-52). 
Nevertheless, we could also find the cases quite the 
opposite from western food items. Coca Cola, for example, 
told us another story. In her study about the appeal to the 
Chinese inner culture, Chin-ning Chu found that Coca Cola 
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was taken by Chinese as an elite and prestigious drink. They 
chose the Coke that was more expensive than their Chinese 
soft drink because Coke drinking was a status symbol. "It -is 
a symbols of success. The rich Chinese drink Coke; the poor 
Chinese drink tea It will be difficult for Pepsi Cola to 
top Coke's sales in China by lowering its price. The 
price needs to stay up to maintain its image as a status 
symbol" (Chu 1988:241). To her surprise, Chu asked many 
Chinese to find that most of them preferred the taste of 
Pepsi Cola to that of Coca Cola (Chu 1988:242). But people 
would rather consume a product best known of its kind in the 
world to maintain their face. 
The similarity of food culture between Taiwanese and 
Fujianese was based on its historical development as mentioned 
in earlier sections. It was possible that the Mainland 
consumers weaved the familiar products into their daily 
identities and food selection in a more easy way than their 
counterparts in other areas did. There existed a unanimous 
comment among the Taiwan instant noodle manufacturers that 
the credit of their booming business should partially go to 
the Nationalist Government retreating from Mainland to 
Taiwan in 1949. It brought the Mainland consumers from 
different provinces to this island and made it possible to 
study the wide varieties of their tastes to suit different 
Chinese consumers. That was why foreign enterprises could 
hardly beat them in this field. 
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Chapter 4 
Taiwanese Business Behavior Pattern in the China Market 
Guanxi is what we call personal connections or personal 
relationship in Chinese usage. It could be treated as a factor 
carrying the meaning of the historical contexts of cultural 
identity. It was a cultural phenomenon shared by ethnic 
Chinese everywhere in Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong as well as 
by overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and even in North 
America. Its implications appeared in economic transactions 
(Yang 1994:6) and closely related with the Taiwanese merchants 
in Mainland China. The emphasis on guanxi is one of the most 
striking components in Chinese culture. It became apparent 
that we could not afford to skip such a crucial topic in our 
discussion on ethnicity, cultural identity and business 
practices. Its affinity with Chinese ways of doing business 
is subtle and its ubiquitous power can not be overstated. 
3.1 Guanxi as a Socio-cultural Value Shared by Ethnic Chinese 
Mayfair Yang indicated that the art of guanxi chiefly 
comprised of gifts, favors and banq~ets (Yang 19~4). Michael 
Bond saw that the reciprocation of greetings, favors and 
gifts were the value orientations taken straight from the 
teachings of Confucious (Hofstede 1991:166). Geert Hofstede 
had incorporated such values into his discussion on the 
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Confucious and recent economic growth of the East Asian 
countries that preserved much belief in tradition (Hofstede 
1991:166-70). Ambrose King deemed the Confucian dynamism as 
a positive factor that propelled the modernization. King 
also regarded that the transformation of Confucianism and 
emergence of rationalistic tradition could be congenial to 
the economic development of industrial East Asia (King 1991b). 
Noticing the dazzling prosperity of the Four Little Dragons, 
Carol Jones felt that the rule of relationships based on 
Confucian hierarchy once deemed as ominous for business 
performance should receive a favorable reconsideration. The 
Chinese societies of Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong used 
the guanxi to largely supplement the rule of law in their 
industrial development and globalization process (Jones 1994). 
Based on a long-term investigation in Mainland China, 
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Mayfair Yang lays the anthropological definition of guanxi \ 
as follows. "The art of guanxi is a complex cuI tural 
phenomenon that combines instrumental motivations with highly 
developed set of ethics rooted in aspects of a popular form 
of the Confucian tradition" (Yang 1994:71). Mayfair Yang also 
pointed out that guanxi was heavily used by the general 
public during the period of Cultural Revolution and came 
into vogue again with the China economic reform policy since 
the beginning of 1980s (Yang 1994). And Ambrose King saw 
that guanxi and networks building was not at odds with the 
commercial energies in the Post-Mao era. It came to meet the 
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special needs in a period of the socio-political transition 
(King 1991a). How the guanxi functioned in business practices 
received a fuller cultural analysis by Carol Jones in her 
study of capitalism, globalization and the rule of law. Jones 
regarded that "despite its lack of formal legal rationality, 
Mainland" China also seems able to provide sufficient 
predicability, calculability and stability for capitalism to 
thrive. It can be argued that guanxi facilitates rather than 
hinders this process" (Jones 1994:200). 
We thus understood that the cultural preference for 
guanxi was shared by the Mainland and overseas Chinese 
societies. But, how did the latter meet the former in China 
market? According to Jones, "the majority of foreign 
investment in China flows from Chinese in the 'Four Little 
Dragons' - 70 percent of China's foreign investments comes 
from Chinese investors abroad" (Jones 1994:202). She also 
noticed that "the main investors - the overseas Chinese are ,. 
not concerned with the absense of 'rule of law' since they 
primarily depend upon guanxi to secure their investment ... 
most (non-Chinese foreign) investment in China is handled 
through Hong Kong lawyers well acquainted with the need for 
guanxi; and non-Chinese fo~eign investment in Chtna is far 
outstripped by overseas Chinese investors, also well versed 
in the art of guanxi (Jones 1994:208-9). 
The high correlation between guanxi and business 
performance in Mainland China had been confirmed by Alan and 
Josephine Smart (Smart & Smart 1992; Smart 1993) and many 
other businesspeople. The merit of using guanxi in speeding 
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up the process of establishing an enterprise had been referred 
to by Alan Smart. Yet, it came to his attention that this 
convenience might also be "at the cost of relying upon social 
guarantees rather than on carefully negotiated legal guarantees 
set out in contractual documents" (Smart 1993:397). 
Was there any conceptual variation between Taiwanese 
businesspeople and their Chinese counterparts in the Mainland 
on the cultural form of guanxi? As laywer Wei-hsiung Chu 
indicated, their business networks in Taiwan were based on 
renqinwang (Chu 1995:12). Such networks of human feelings 
were cultivated through years in their working places and 
home towns. People could not afford to lose their prestige 
or 'face' in front of their acquaintances if they broke the 
social relationships in their neighborhood. So the business 
practices should proceed in a trustworthy manner. Nevertheless, 
how could they possibly generate the same kind of social 
networks with their partners in the Mainland without costing 
the parallel amounts of time and attention? This fragile 
cultural identity of guanxi based on short-terms mutual 
benefits might incur unpredicability in their later partnership 
development. 
Po-hsun Cheng studied the organizational culture of those 
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investors having parent companies in Taiwan and branch 
companies in Mainland China (Cheng 1996). He compared the 
managerial practices and value orientation between the two 
regions under different regimes. Cheng founq that the 
divergent economic, political and social developments in the 
two areas in the past five decades, had led to certain 
cultural variations. But some similarities in cultural 
beliefs and practices still remained intact. According to 
the samples collected from the electric industry, food 
industry and service industry, Cheng found that among many 
other cultural values, people in both sides of Taiwan Strait 
placed the same five priorities in their value orientation 
lists. They were spiritual debt or gratitude orientation, 
human feelings orientation, altruism orientation, familism 
orientation and power or authority orientation according to 
the ascending importance sequence. The major defferences of 
the two sides laid in that Taiwanese merchants exhibited 
~ I 
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stronger orientation in familism, altruism, and human feelings 
than their Chinese counterparts. As to how individuals 
related to authority in the workplaces, Mainlanders also 
showed a stronger power distance orientation than Taiwanese 
did (Cheng 1996:17). 
What Cheng called human feelings orientation involved 
the return of the debt of human feelings, caring about the 
face or prestige of the persons with whom one interacted, 
and fulfilling one's role in the frameworks of his social 
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relationships (Cheng 1996:14)~ As lawyer Chu indicated, the 
business networks of the Taiwanese merchants could still work 
out at home on the ground that their networks of human 
feelings were cultivated through years in their familiar 
working and living environments. If they left for the Mainland 
for the sake of business, they should adapt themselves to the 
new environment which carried less human feelings webs than 
their original surroundings did. 
The relation between Taiwanese merchants and their 
counterparts in Mainland China was similar to what Yunxiang 
Yan called 'extended form of guanxi'. The business networks 
they cultivated in Taiwan were imbedded in what Yan called 
the 'primary form of guanxi'. "The expressive components of 
these primary relations - familial, kinship and communal -
determine the importance of moral obligations, emotional 
attachments, and stable reciprocity over long periods within 
the guanxi networks, all of which are reflected in the ," 
notion of renqin, 'human feelings'" (Yan 1996: 22). With the 
temporary and personal interest nature, much Mainlanders 
treated the Taiwanese merchants as the newly encountered 
outsiders. The 'extended forms of guanxi and renqin derive 
from interactions with outsiders for utilitarian 4 purposes" 
(Yan 1996:23), and are irrelevant to "the local moral world 
in which one lives" (Yan 1996:22). 
With such understanding that the guanxi they used to 
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know at home might transmute into another cultural form in 
Mainland China, Taiwanese merchants could be more prepared 
to adapt their guanxi-like behavior to interact with their , 
counterparts in the host societies. The extended form of 
guanxi might be built out of practical business needs to 
meet the expectations of the both parties involved. If they 
did not have enough time in their business travels to 
participate the cultural contruction of the primary form of 
guanxi, formal legal protection would be an advised item to 
supplement the lack of stability in the extended form of 
guanxi with their partners in Mainland China. 
These discussions can help us understand the complex 
operations of the business interactions between the Taiwanese 
investors and their Mainland counterparts. Some informants 
even develop their own philosophical views from their 
experiences. To arrive at a sound interpretation for the 
cultural phenomenon and the behavior patterns of the Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs in Mainland China, it is a must to place the 
art of social relationships and high correlation between 
guanxi and economic performances under a careful review. 
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4.2 The Political Culture of Guanxi 
According to Geert Hofstede, the Chinese societies as a 
variant of 'large power distance societies' are prevailed 
with the "philosophical systems stressing hierarchy and 
stratification". Furthermore, in Chinese societies, "power 
is based on family or friends, charisma, and ability to use 
force. The powerful have privileges. The way to change a 
political system is by changing the people at the top" 
(Hofstede 1991:42-3). 
Michael Bond also observed that "Chinese in leadership 
positions enjoy a wider range of authority for which they are 
unaccountable than do those from more democratic legalistic 
systems" (Bond 1991:85). He also came to the conclusion that 
the bribery used to influence the decision making process of 
the persons in charge that occurred in Chinese organizational 
life, was largely induced by the Confucian hierarchy. Bond 
established the correlation between the corruption behavior 
and Confucian value system. This value system is also 
represented in the Chinese way of managerial practices and 
organization behaviors. Robert Silin's analysis of the 
Chinese leadership pattern in the large-scale Ta~wan 
enterprises revealed such Chinese political culture and 
value orientation in the art of ruling and strict superior-
subordinate relationship (Silin 1976). 
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Mayfair Yang gave even greater details of the origin and 
socio-political development of the art of guanxi and Confucian 
hierarchy. But she did not see the using of guanxi to achieve 
personal benefits as a kind of bribery or corruption in terms 
of western notion. Its operation contributes to weave the 
sense of obligation into the wider social fabric of lives 
and identities. In accordance with Confucianism, the 
subordinates owed the superiors respect and obedience; the 
superiors owed the subordinates protection and consideration. 
In the type of large distance societies, people "accept and 
appreciate inequality, but feel the use of power should be 
moderated by a sense of obligation" (Hofstede 1991:40). 
Mr. Tsai, a Taiwanese businessman, once was requested 
by the Chinese local authority to apply for a license of his 
manufacturing factory. As far as I knew, a local cadre, 
Mr. Fang came to this Taiwanese friend's assistance when the 
latter was blackmailed by the local authority. It happened 
once the workers of this Taiwanese merchant were unduly 
arrested and beaten by the local Joint Brigade, this cadre 
also gave him a hand. I could feel his affective guanxi sincere 
support for the Taiwanese businessman from his narration. 
During the period of deflation in China in 1993, this 
businessman risked a problem of backruptcy. The Chinese 
cadre got the Taiwanese a timely loan in bank without any 
interests charge. At that time China just implemented a 
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macro-economic control policy and strictly discouraged any 
lending of money to foreign investors. 
Political office implies control over a particular 
resource in the Mainland China today. Mayfair Yang showed us 
"how guanxixue (i.e. the art of social relationships) 
exploits the discrepancy that exists between hierarchical 
authority in general and specific jurisdictional authority" 
(Yang 1994:87,74). As seen in Mr. Tsai's case described 
above, he did not appeal to the top officials as expected. 
Instead, he rather turned to a key figure in charge of 
practical matters through his personal networks for a 
special favor and saved his firm from crisis. 
In Michael Bond's observation of Chinese organizational 
behavior, "corruption" was one of the indirect consequences 
of the Confucian hierarchy. He indicated, "the Chinese have 
always conferred considerable discretionary authority on 
those in responsible positions, preferring to trust human 
judgement rather than mechanisitic laws. Within a hierarchy 
these authorities are less subject to supervisory checks and 
balances than are those in a more democratic political 
tradition. The stage is thus set for petitioners ·to attempt 
to influence the decisions of such officials through waht 
Westerners call 'bribery'" (Bond 1991 :85-6). "The granting 
of 'favours' is an important component of paternalism, as it 
builds a network of people tied to someone in authority out 
of indebtedness and obligation. Such a network is an 
invaluable resource in an arbitrary world unprotected by the 
rule of law" (Bond 1991:86). 
In the large power distance and particularist societies 
like Chinese communities, people valued highly the personal 
connections and trusted the usage of guanxi mechanism. As 
shown above, its personalistic qualities of obligation, 
indebtedness and reciprocity were part of life and identity 
of both the Taiwanese merchant and the local cadre. Mayfair 
Yang rarely saw eye to eye with him on the way Bond described 
the social relationships above. Yang put it this way, "the 
art of guanxi cannot be reduced to a modern notion of 
corruption because the personalistic qualities of obligation, 
indebtedness, and reciprocity are just as important as 
transactions in material benefit" (Yang 1994:108). 
The subtlety of guanxi was not easy for non-Chinese to 
follow. Bribery or corruption was apparently against the law. 
But guanxi in a way smoothed the business procedures without 
breaking the law. With its ethical and emotional nature, 
guanxi became more understandable to the ethnic Chinese. 
From some examples we could see that Western and .Japanese 
businessmen shared the interest of guanxi with their 
Taiwanese counterparts. Ethnic Chinese professionals from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and North America were 
hired as expatriate managers in Mainland China. They fully 
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developed the guanxi networks to bridge their employers' 




4.3 Taiwanese Ethnic Edge in the China Market 
Does guanxi really matter for the economic performances 
of the Taiwanese merchants in Mainland China and deserve our 
special attention? In her study of the trade secret of the 
East, Chin-ning Chu compared the competitive business tactics 
of Americans, Japanese, Europeans and Hongkongese. She also 
pointed out that Hongkongese had an edge over others and put 
it this way, "Hong Kong Chinese have a natural advantage in 
dealing with China expensive gifts are often given by 
the Hong Kong business people to their Chinese partners. 
These gifts are such things as refrigerators, televisions, 
electronic consumer items or scholarships for their children 
to schools in the United States or Europe. Although these 
are bribes, the Hong Kong Chinese are able to present them 
in such an elegant manner that the bribery is disguised. 
These gentle bribes sweeten proposed financial deals" (Chu 
1988:244). Chu indicated the gifts and bribes tactfully used 
by the Hong Kong Chinese in their business strategy. 
~fter investigating the Hong Kong investment in Mainland 
China, Alan Smart and Josephine Smart suggested that guanxi 
as a valuable cultural asset might belp the Hong.Kong Chinese 
befavorably situated in the China market (Smart & Smart 1992; 
Smart 1993). Furthermore, "international investors can 
utilize the advantages possessed by the Hong Kong investors 
by using them as subcontractors" (Smart & Smart 1992:60). 
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The most common strategy employed by the Hong Kong businessmen 
was the utilization of the social connections in the location 
of investment and relationship of gift exchange. Alan Smart 
(1993) in his another case study saw that gifts, bribes and 
guanxi as a means of social investment could exercise an 
invisible power upon economic activities. Only sophisticated 
persons cultivated with Chinese cultural tradition could 
sense the subtle social situations and foresee the chances. 
That could largely explain the prosperity of businessmen 
from Hong Kong. Smart deemed the art of guanxi as a unique 
Chinese cultural asset for doing business in the Mainland. 
The economic success of the Hong Kong merchants was highly 
correlated with their familiarity with the art of guanxi. 
The European and American corporations lost ground to some 
degree from their restricting practices to contract and 
market exchange and paid little attention to the aspects of 
social relationship (Smart 1993:402). Chu also has the same 
observation, "when it comes to understanding the subtleties 
of Chinese mind, American business people and politicians 
usually take a back seat to Europeans and other Asians" 
(Chu 1988:243). 
In other words, the art of guanxi that invo~ved a 
highly developed set of traditonal knowledge, might not be so 
easy for the non-Chinese to follow. One of my Japanese , friends 
Mr. Takeda complained that he observed the conventional 
practices and had not earned much satisfactory result so far. 
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The meetings opened with giving their Chinese partners 
envelopes of money as a rule. He might not fully recognize 
certain points of the art of guanxi and could hardly tell 
the blurring line between gift exchange and effective bribe, 
the subtlety residing in the personal relationships as well 
as the cultural persistance in Chinese philosophy on decency, 
thus failed to grasp the messages in their interactions and 
set his business in motion. • 
j'! 
So, with the knowledge of Chinese convention, Taiwanese 
merchants might also make better use of such available social 
capital than other foreign investors in the Mainland to go 
through the red-tape. Other things being equal, investors 
from Taiwan as well as Hong Kong might be more entitled to 
earn the PR bonus and enlist the help from the authorities 
concerned partly because they held the social and cultural 
resources to transfer into economic capital. When I expressed 
my surprise with the big numbers of Taiwan-Japan joint 
ventures in Xiamen, the prudent official Mr. Kong added, "By 
the same token, quite a few small-scale American and European 
corporations were ushered into the Mainland by Hong Kong 
Chinese or Singaporeans chiefly due to their unfamiliarity 
with an alien socio-cultural environment at the ~arly 
developmental stages. Now the large-scale multinational 
investors only needed to negotiate with central authorities 
to finalize the deals. They could be saved from the trouble 
due to socio-cultural maladjustment". Yet, the advantage of 
being large-scale corporations he mentioned was offset in 
part by the fact I learned from certain Taiwanese and 
Hong Kong Chinese managers working for those well-known 
multinational companies. They showed me how Chinese beliefs 
and practices influenced their decision making, and in what 
manner they employed the skillful strategies to cope with 
the public relations problem. 
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Thus, it was generally supposed that Taiwan businessmen 
took the best advantage of their inherent cultural skills to 
adjust themselves to new, yet comparatively familiar condition 
in the Mainland, and make things easier to work out. Like the 
grammatical rules ingrained in the daily language, cultural 
habit and custom came to their plain living so naturally that 
people somehow use it without effort. They could win over 
foreign investors or managers in the Mainland by this 
unnoticed cultural advantage (Bosco 1994:9). Nevertheless, 
their easy circumstances might be more apparent than real. 
My fieldwork encounter with the hotel manager Mr. Huang 
from Taiwan reminded me of the hardships that he had been 
gone through in his early socialization process and later 
incessant life long practices. His hotel was a jqint venture 
enterprise with Taiwanese partners holding a larger shares. 
At first he said much in praise of his Chinese partners' 
caring about the benefits of other shareholders. These old 
men cherished the traditional Confucian teachings on the 
harmonious and peaceful personal relationships. Basically 
the internal management was run by the staff recruited from 
Taiwan. He introduced me to the other well-educated Taiwanese 
managers. Some of them even mastered Japanese and Korean 
languages. When we became familiar with each other later, he 
began to talk more negative but candid comments. In addition 
to securing their own part of the revenues, he admitted that 
the China side of the joint venture corporation did impose 
some nuisance persons and fees. Not long ago he paid a fine 
for not purchasing the restaurant menus or garbage cans from 
the designated units. 
As to the social relationships, Mr. Huang drew a sigh 
and t 0 I d me, "I t wash a r d t 0 b e a Chi n e se. I nth eWe s t , 
you might say what you intended to do and clearly claim 
your expectation. But in Chinese societies, there was 
something you just could not speak out though you might do 
it. Taiwan and Mainland alike, their developmental stages 
and business cycles might not be synchronized with each 
other, but, they showed the same essence in using gifts, 
favors and banquets to go through red-tape. They differed 
only in degree". A conscientious men with law as well as MEA 
background like him still clung to traditional world view to 
work up his business and get along with his Chinese colleagues 
in the Mainland. He proudly told me his golden principle in 
dealing with interpersonal relations, "I would rather make 
people owe me a debt of human feeling than otherwise at the 
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usual time, then save it for future moments of need." 
The comments of Mr. Takeda and Mr. Huang could be used 
as a reference for inquiry into the ralations between personal 
connections and Chinese ways of doing business. They also 
served to test the uniqueness of guanxi that distinguished 
ethnic Chinese merchants and non-Chinese in dealing with 
business matters in Mainland China. 
A real estate businessman Mr. Kao taught me, money 
itself would not necessarily buy you useful personal 
connections. Only heart-to-heart friends were good for 
depending on when you needed help. Time permitting, go to 
visit the officials concerned first to pay your regards. 
Don't just send your subordinates to call on them until you 
really needed them to settle serious matters for you. These 
big figures are just like Tiger Balm in the very occasion. 
Their comments could carry ointment with soothing effect to 
save your projects or peppery mint contents to destroy your 
careers depending on the genuine quality of your personal 
relations to decide where to place on." I knew he was not 
alone. A Taiwan immigrant in Canada Mr. Chiang also seconded 
his idea. Although his golf club business was not booming 
these days, he did not complain about the Chinese bureaucratic 
system, but rather deemed it a "timing" problem. His company 
was established in 1989. Since his chief partner withdrew 
the investment right after June Fourth, he had no choice but 
to run on his own. So far he never felt bothered by bribery 
problem. Basically he believed in harmonious relations 
built out of mutual respect. 
When -asked what would be the most important criteria in 
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his negotiation process with the authorites concerned, a 
capable young Taiwanese staff Mr. Kuo affiliated to a golf 
club corporation told me, guanxi background came first, 
western management second. You had to be patient with the 
entanglement of personal tie of affect and obligation." He 
then offered a concrete example. There was a time when he 
learned that the relevant Mainland officials in charge of 
land and other project approval matters would have a tour in 
Hong Kong. He and his co-workers flew from Taipei immediately 
to treat them a big meal. It was an unforgettable banquet for 
both sides. The price of the lobsters, fine Japanese rice 
wine and other specialty cuisines was so dear that made him 
bewildered. Much to their entertainment, the guests enjoyed 
the impressive dishes4 He threw the banquet well in advance 
of making a request. When he arrived in the Mainland for a 
project one morning, this young man sighted the familiar 
face of the official sitting there waiting for him. One of 
his friends made fun of him by saying that "So moved. How 
enthusiastic and sincere you were!" 
As Mayfair Yang suggested, "Gift or banquet giving 
both involve much etiquette and polite rituals, which serve 
to save face for both sides. Efforts are made by. the gift 
giver or dinner host to leave the impression that he or she 
does not regard the gift or dinner as a crude bribe or mere 
payment for services rendered, but as a social occasion for 
establishing good relations" (Yang 1994:136). This young man 
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further showed me the ropes of throwing business banquets he 
learned from trial and error. Mr. Kuo once made a phone call 
to reserve a dining table in a famous tourist city and was 
shocked by the response of the Mainland waitress. She put it 
straight forward, "What was the status level of the guests 
you intended to serve? Say, three hundred RMB for director 
of department under provincial government, five hundred for 
county magistrate, etc. We would arrange for you." He then 
realized the prevalence of official banquets in the society. 
The life stories narrated by the merchants themselves 
all indicated the prevalence of using personal networks to 
get dealings done by means of gifts, favors and banquets in 
their business activities. They corresponded well with 
Mayfair Yang' argument. Yang earned her insight for the 
gift economy or art of guanxi in socialist China by searching 
the skeleton of the local history. She went to great lengths 
to identify the socio-cultural legacy and the institutional 
legacy of China. 
Another example was a Hong Kong Chinese manager Mr. Lee 
working for a well-known American corporation in the Mainland. 
He went to Guangzhou quite often to coordinate the source 
supply and shipment matters. The short working hours of the 
customs caused serious delay problem. Both his former British 
supervisor and ex-Chinese American colleague failed to settle 
it because they never earned the friendship of the customs 
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officials. The British did not know why the way it was. And 
the America born Chinese just bluntly asked them to fire the 
irresponsible officials. The Hong Kong manager was wise to 
see that their western way of thinking would not work out in 
the Mainland with half an eye. The special social situation 
in Mainland China should be recognized. Gifts, banquets and 
favors could be one of the solutions to answer the mind games 
of those Cantonese officials. He learned that the cultural 
habits and social environment lent support to each other and 
mutually reinforced in shaping human thinking and behaviors. 
Mr. Lee then invited the officials concerned to decent 
restaurants from time to time. When they asked the name of 
the shark's fin delicacy on the menu under the guise of 
curiosity, he would tell the boss, "Why not serve every body 
this dish to know what the shark's fin look like?" When they 
complained the delay owing to the communication difficulty, 
he said, "Go ahead. Buy the high-tech mobile telephone right 
away. My company would pay for it." He quickly grasped their 
questions with suggestions and soon established a smooth 
cooperation relations with those customs staff. They set the 
seal for him even after working hours and the delay delivery 
seldom happened from then on. It wa~ the Chinese wisdom of 
this Hong Kong manager to bring a happy endding for both 
parties. He then nicely showed me how the American 
multinational firm digested the lubrication fees under the 
dissimulation fund of research and development. He even 
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indicated that Taiwan businessmen lost ground to some 
degree since they were not generous enough in treating the 
persons concerned. Partly for the small scale of the 
enterprises, the bosses themselves were the public relations 
managers. Unlike the hired staff spending public funds like 
him, those petty Taiwan entrepreneurs felt reluctant to pay 
such expensive lubrication fees which they could not afford 
in a long period, and liked to seek the items in grey areas 
to save their tax burdens. 
I was convinced from my field observation that most of 
the personal relations were soundly based on mutual benefit 
consideration rather than purely triggered by renqin (i.e. 
human feelings). The gift economy might be largely diluted 
with lucrative ends. Here Ambrose King had a good grasp of 
such cultural meanings. He sensed that the traditional kin 
or fictive kin-based normative orientation could be changed 
by changing events in the cultural secularization or the 
rational transformation into modern capitalism. Though the 
business behavior was conditioned by Confucian concept, 
people preferred to select the elements propitious for their 
enterprises, and sometimes left the ominous ones without 
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much hesitation to preserve their business careers. Thus the 
prototype of a new Confucianism surfaced to meet their 
profitable ends practically (King 1991b). Such an understanding 
would certainly help us better appreciate Chinese art of 
social relationships. 
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4.5 The Changing Patterns of Guanxi Practice 
Mayfair Yang distinguished the guanxi phenomenon of 
the Economic Reform of the 1980s from that of the Cultural 
Revolution by pointing out the transition from 'Use-value' to 
'exchange-value'. "That is to say, with the introduction of 
elements of a market economy, oftentimes, it is not direct use 
and consumption that is at stake in each guanxi exchange, but 
guanxi's transmutation into further wealth and opportunities. 
The means are now often the end" (Yang 1994:159). She noticed 
that "In the late 1980s and 1990s, American and British 
cigarettes entered the guanxi circuits. Alcoholic spirits 
are often given in conjunction with cigarettes for pulling 
guanxi In the ten years from 1982 to 1992, however, 
money gifts in certain contexts became more acceptable 
socially and more popular, their legal status having been 
assured by increasing market forces which sanctioned payment 
for services rendered" (Yang 1994:128-9). 
A Taiwanese jeweler Mr. Pei told me that a NT$10 lighter 
would suit the needs of the Mainland co-workers well when he 
visited an inland province for diamond field in the early 
1980s. Now even the American tobacco and wine could scarcely 
meet their desires. He thus allowed them to have shares in 
the business firm to motivate their cooperative spirits. 
There was a time he had all his raw diamonds cut and refined 
in a public factory half a year to please the authorites 
concerned. Although he knew it well that two weeks would be 
enough for the professional workers in other countries to 
finish the same job, he would rather waste the time and wages 
to pave the way for good relations with those officials for 
futher use. The interest motivation was quite clear for both 
sides. 
The gift given did not have to be a concrete object. A 
local cadre I knew pretty well happily drove his high class 
Japanese car to show me around. As a capable man and taking 
an active interest in public life, he thought himself 
deserving the present from his Hong Kong friend. But, in 
this socialist nation, he found no way to import such a 
luxurious automobile in his own name. Since each foreign 
corporation could apply at least two cars for business use, 
one of his Taiwanese friend made the application for him. 
This merchant depended heavily on him for security and 
red-tape matters all the time. His application form for 
business use cars itself could be an invisible gift for the 
cadre. It was also an unspeakably precious gift in current 
China. And it was acquired under favor of the grey area of 
the unsound regulations. Their affectionate friendship built 
out of actual needs, now grew even stronger with the mutual 
benefits. 
Besides, the young cadre's sister worked in this 
Taiwanese firm as a sales manager. He really cared about the 
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fate of this company as well as his sister's job and bonus. 
Actually, his older sister was more than an ordinary woman. 
Her husband was the chairman of one big state-run corporation 
and knew quite a few high ranking Chinese officials. That 
Taiwanese boss had a business brain to use this Mainland 
manager to settle the dealings. Through the networks and 
influence of this sales manager, he might earn many orders. 
According to Helen F. Siu's ethnographic findings on 
the merchant culture and region's unorthodox development in 
Pearl River Delta of Guangdong Province, the new generation 
of local cadres in the post-Mao era largely controlled the 
business operation.#4 Through their postions in the state 
system, these new local bosses, in a sense, captured the 
market and engaged themselves in commercial activities. 
Considering the current social situations, Taiwan merchants 
in Mainland China might take this source of socio-political 
energy into account while deciding their economic actions. 
From what they encountered in the daily business lives, 
these merchants not only conformed themselves to the ways of 
the world and applied their knowledge of guanxi networks, 
but they also molded their own philosophy towards the art of 
social relationships in China, and included their learning 
newly acquired from the changing events to further develop 
their skills. On the one hand, Taiwanese merchants were the 
children of their Chinese culture valuing Confucian hierarchy 
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and guanxi scheme. On the other hand, they were conscious 
of and participating in the changing world in a creative way 
to shape the art of social relations. From the experiences , 
of certain Taiwanese merchants, we could find the crucial 
role of guanxi in their business activities. The major 
components of guanxi included the familiarity, harmonious 
relations built out of mutual trust and respect, personal 
tie of affect and obligation, sincerity, etc. Gifts, favors, 
and banquets were the common ways to establish the relations 
with their counterparts in the Mainland. 
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4.6 Discussion on the Rationality of the Guanxi Value System 
Interest-oriented social connections mostly resulted 
from the practical needs of capitalist investment . Far from 
building a castle in the air, businessmen rationalized the 
instrumental role of guanxi. Ambrose King regarded that 
"the practice of kuan-hsi (i.e. guanxi) was "not necessarily 
incompatible with modernization" (King 1991a:80). The devious 
way of walking through the back door in the Mainland today 
was chiefly due to its special situation arising from drastic 
social and economic transition. "The often criticized 
traditional behavioral norms are officially sanctioned in 
privatized, interpersonal relations. During this rapid 
transition stage when the socialist universalistic values are 
cast into doubt and the market is not yet fully opened, kuan-
hsi blossoms to play a new instrumental role for people to 
achieve what is usually denied them through normal channels" 
(King 1991a:80). Taiwanese merchants usually enlisted the 
help from the authorities concerned by means of guanxi. It 
was not totally because they were, by nature, circumscribed 
by the Chinese cultural habits, but rather out of realistic 
considerations. To excavate the meanings behind the phenomena 
interwoven with industrial impact and socio-cultural 
background, the great economic concern of the bourgeois and 




Carol Jones argues that East Asia and China thrive, to 
a degree, on the rule of relationships and marginalization 
of formal law. They adopted an alternative trajectory which 
is contrary to the development of western capitalism insisting 
on a rational formal law. Thus, the cultural role of guanxi 
will not necessarily deny itself to the growth of capitalism 
and a successful market economy in the Four Little Dragons 
and Mainland China (Jones 1994). But, from the statistics 
released by the governmental units, however, we can still 
find numerous Taiwan businesspeople failed their business 
because of their over trusting guanxi which neglecting the 
rule of law in Mainland China (Executive Yuan 1992). 
In the following paragraphs, I will carefully review 
the experience of a Taiwan manufacturing factory owner and 
a semi-retirement Mainland staff serving as a consultant in 
another company. So far, the Taiwan cases discussed are 
mostly confined to the small-medium scale enterprises. We 
can read a large scale reputed Taiwan corporation benefiting 
from its guanxi networks. 
M L On a Mainland Official r . l, in semi-retirement worked 
as a consultant in a Taiwan company~ Once he com~lained to 
me that his boss was so careless in the legal matters that 
he signed the contracts bearing obvious disadvantages to 
himself. When he asked the gullible boss to be more cautious, 
this merchant just naively replied that in Taiwan he usually 
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made several phonecalls to settle these dealings without 
formal written documents. Those long-term friends and familiar 
clients were all trustworthy. There was no reason to be picky 
and break the good relations with them. This consultant 
deemed these outlandish words inconceivable at first. After 
knowing each other better in the later days, he warned his 
boss with kind of understanding by telling him "be mindful 
of legal aspects for transactions in Mainland China. People 
cheated you because you were ignorant of law, not because 
you were Taiwanese. Japanese or other foreigners alike, 
could be cheated if they did not understand the business 
law." Mr. Lin continued, "it was a must to pay attention to 
the social environment here as well as what the people 
thought here if you wanted to do business with them." 
In my understanding, this consultant had retired from a 
long service in the state commercial office. His rich 
experience in business circles and vast networks of guanxi 
cultivated through years in different sectors of industry 
and government kept him well informed of the supply sources 
with low prices. That Taiwanese boss was wise to hire him 
and use his guanxi networks to identify the socio-political 
and economic sources. Indeed, this Mainland consultant was 
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helpful and indicated the invisible pitfalls lying in the 
transactions for him. 
But, what would happen if the very businessman trusted 
a man in an unstable position of the Chinese bureaucratic 
system. Or a man generously gaved his words of pledge that 
had never been fulfilled. According to the study of the 
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failed Taiwan cases in Mainland China compiled by the Working 
Committee on Mainland Affairs in Taipei (Executive Yuan 1992), 
most of the Taiwanese merchants regarded that their failures 
had unfortunately much to do with the guanxi problem. After 
analyzing the cause and effect, these merchants found that 
guanxi was even more important in Mainland China societies 
tinged with the personal rule than they imagined. They failed 
because they did not pay enough time and care to it and were 
thus excluded from the favorist lists. They had to suffer 
nightmairs like being cut of the factory electricity supply 
without prior notice. They might also fail because they 
touched the wrong persons that placed their serious pledge 
on banquets, then ate their own words later. And the merchants 
could fail because the persons with whom they built networks 
retired or transferred to another official positions, and 
thus discontinued the projects in agreement. 
Compared with Euro-American businesspeople, Taiwanese 
merchants obviously placed little emphasis on law. When 
commercial disagreements arised, westerners judged the 
situation with legal contracts while Taiwanese reasoned in 
terms of friendship with special obligation. After settling 
the business dealings, westerners signed the contracts without 
necessarily having banquets for their partners while Taiwanese 
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threw the banquets without necessarily signing the contracts. 
They depended much upon oral commitment to get things done. 
Such a business practice relied largly on renqinwang (i.e. 
networks of human feelings) to maintain the social relationship 
and economic operation at the same time. This practice without 
legal guarantee might still work out in Taiwan society (Chu 
1995:12-3). 
Generally speaking, problems seldom occurred in the 
stage of application for licences, permissions or certificates 
issued by the Chinese governmental units because Taiwanese 
merchants valued highly the personal relations with the 
officials concerned. Problems usually happened in the 
contractual relations with other enterprises and consumers 
like suppliers, re-processing factories, distributers and 
sub-contractors. There also existed the problems in the 
contractual relations with the internal share holders and 
staff members (Chu 1995:12-3). 
It became apparent that using guanxi did help them 
smoothly get through the red tape. Some businesspeople were 
so immersed in the personal connections that they ignored 
certain critical legal matters, especially the cQntracts 
law and labor law, as Chu pointed out. He felt that guanxi 
should not become the limelight at the cost of law. To 
dovetail into China market, neither one of them could be 
underestimated (Chu 1995:13). 
According to the recent talk presented by Kung-lien Kao, 
the Taipei official in charge of the trade affairs between 
Taiwanese merchants and their counterparts in Mainland China, 
Chinese Communists tried hard to establish various legal 
institutions to meet the requirement of a sound market 
economy. To protect their own rights, Taiwanese investors 
must learn the way of multinational corporations which dealt 
business matters in accordance with the rule of law (Kao 
1996:13-4). This statement suggested a point that big 
enterprises relied little on the rule of relationships and 
guanxi itself was an unadvised element in the business 
practices. My observation in Mainland China might provide 
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the cases quite the opposite. It cost less efforts for 
multinational corporations to pave the way for guanxi networks 
with their partners in Mainland China because the Mainland 
authorites generally prized the relations with the big 
foreign enterprisers and actively sought to cooperate with 
them. These large corporations still could not be totally 
free from the involvement of personal relationships or 
social networks pertaining to traditional Chinese culture. 
Eupa was a reputable big Taiwan enterprise. The products 
of this multinational corporation occupied almost up to t of 
the world market of irons and many other electric appliances. 
It followed strictly the required procedures to set up its 
business in Mainland China. In October 1995 I went to visit 
its factory for electric appliances production in Xiamen. It 
was about the same time in 1994 that both this multinational 
corporation and another big Taiwan precision instruments 
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group located in Shenzhen entrusted the Hitron Technology Inc. 
to develop an enterprise information highway (EIH) to 
facilitate their own picture telecommunication conference 
system and hi-fi sonagraph system. Those projects tended to 
enhance the simultaneous communication between their parent 
companies in Taiwan and branch units in Mainland China. 
Their initiating the high-tech information networks was not 
only based on the cost-benefit analysis, but also on the 
timing effect upon their decision making and problem solving. 
The president of Eupa placed much emphasis upon the research 
and development on streamline .design as well as its own-brand 
promotion (Li 1995). He valued the research outcome of his 
Taiwan parent company and information analysis by his staff 
of overseas agencies in Japan and the United States. He 
deemed it the sooner the better to transfer the research 
result to the assembly line in Mainland China. 
At first sight, Shenzhen was a better situated city in 
terms of infrastructure to work out such an information 
engineering project. Other things b~ing equal, the related 
enterprise group in Shenzhen said above should have completed 
the project faster than that of Eupa. However, the event was 
opposite to what I expected. It finished the EIH production 
six months later than that of Eupa because it had to build 
the cable ranging from Hong Kong to Shenzhen by itself. On 
the other hand, Xiamen government favored Eupa by building a 
cable line free for Eupa to connect outside regions. The 
manager of Hitron Technology could only explain this 
discrepancy of networks building schedule from the view of 
guanxi. He said, "many things could be dealt quite 
differently in the Mainland according to the depth of one's 
personal connections with the persons-in-charge in different 
areas (Chao 1995:109-11). 
I was told by the Eupa general strategic planning 
manager Mr. Chu in Xiamen that his president had expressed 
the wish of EIH with Xiamen mayor long before the project 
implementation. This Mainland manager happened to have a 
college classmate holding high position in the telecom 
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bureau. That made things easier to work out. His mother was a 
Xiamenese. He gained his degree as well as many years working 
experience in Beijing. He had been served in the customs 
bureau before joining Eupa. I wondered such kind of special 
experience made his boss appointing him as the top supervisor. 
But, he saw that his previous customs experience simply help 
the company handle those practical shipment procedures easily. 
All the matters were settled on a s.ound legal basis. 
It was clear that guanxi would not necessarily be at 
variance with the rule of law. The rule of relationships 
could work hand in hand with the formal legal system to 
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facilitate the business procedures. The president of Eupa 
was a conscientious Taiwanese that I learned from many Xiamen 
locals. Even his using guanxi did not harm his reputation . . 
Usually small enterprises sought to handle their business 
matters with their local social connections. The multinational 
corporations like Eupa and Xiang Lu Industries manufacturing 
chemical fibers in Xiamen might negotiate directly with the 
central authorities. Yet, large enterprises as they were, 
they could scarcely be free from using guanxi. They employed 
the rule of relationships as they saw fit to use. They could 
even use it more justifiably for the blessing from the 
central authorities. 
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4.7 Concluding Remarks 
We have reviewed the art of guanxi in business practices 
and the correlation between guanxi and economic performances 
in the previous sections. In addition to the scholastic 
approval of the guanxi as the inevitable in Chinese business 
implementation environment, we have, so far, seen quite a few 
merchants believing in guanxi and successfully putting it 
into practice in their business affairs. It stood reason to 
them that guanxi set good terms for their negotiation process 
with the authorities concerned and made their plans work out 
satisfactorily. It paid to spend the time and money to build 
the relations with their Chinese partners. Guanxi might play 
a positive role to aid the business matters in a flexible 
and effective manner. Guanxi also suggests an informal way to 
deal with the matters in accordance with the particularistic 
ties which is different from the universalistic values 
attaching to the modern western rational legal system. 
Chapter 5 
Investment, Management and Cultural Affinity 
5.1 Cultural Affinity and Investment Behavior: From 
Donation to Investment 
In her recent ethnographic studies on the merchants in 
South Chinese local society, Helen Siu found that community 
rituals and the language of native place again came into 
vogue to attract the overseas Chinese capital and pave the 
ground for business connections.#5 Carol Jones found that 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and other overseas Chinese abroad together 
accounted for 70 percent of all foreign investment in the 
Mainland (Jones 1994:202). In the Tribes, Joel Kotkin studied 
how race, religion, and identity determine the success in 
the new global economy. Owing to the intrinsic ethnic 
identity, Kotkin sensed that the partnerships between the 
Chinese diaspora and their counterparts in Mainland China 
promised well for their future business arena. He saw that 
"firms from Hong Kong, Taiwan and other (Chinese) diaspora 
centers represent easily the largest source of foreign 
investment within Mainland China, itself both an enormous 
source of inexpensive labor and raw materials and a huge 
potential market" (Kotkin 1993:167). 
The causal significance between ethnicity and economics 
103 
104 
was further demonstrated by Gerald Segal, "China's new 
prosperity is based on interdependence with the outside world 
The closet ties are those between parts of Greater China. 
Some 80 percent of total investment in China comes from 
overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and beyond 
... These thickening webs of international interdependence -
among Chinese in Greater China, with Chinese minorities 
living throughout Southeast Asia and even with neighboring 
non-Chinese countries - are creating unique 'natural economic 
territories'" (Segal 1994:48). In a sense, the ethnic ties 
made the economic integration feasible. A large portion of 
the overseas Chinese capital entered into Mainland China to 
maintain the ethnically based economic links. 
According to Kotkin, after the Tianmen massacre "American 
and other foreign firms might have pulled back in horror from 
the brutal regime, but the overseas Chinese, including as 
many as 3,000 Taiwanese entrepreneurs, actually accelerated 
their investments. Virtually illegal at the beginning of the 
1980s, trade with the Mainland grew so as much as 10 percent 
of all Taiwan's 'foreign' trade and accounted for nearly one 
third of its total worldwide surplus" (Kotkin 1993:196). 
Taiwanese and other overseas Chinese "in 1990 accounted for 
ten times as much of China's new foreign investment as did 
the Japanese - already have transformed the mainland's 
southern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fukien, the 
ancestral homes of most Chinese abroad, into arguably the 
world's most rapidly growing economic region" (Kotkin 1993: 
196-7). 
In his study on the villages in the Pearl River Delta, 
Graham Johnson found that Chinese familism and strong 
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cultural identity provided the context in which the Guangdong 
immigrants in Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and North America 
distinguished themselves from the people of other areas.#6 
The peculiar behavior pattern of these immigrants bore the 
stamp of their feelings of moral obligation toward their 
kins in their ~ommunity of origin. The urbanization, 
industrialization as well as commercialization in the Pearl 
River Delta region were intimately related to the investment 
and donation activities of these overseas Chinese. The 
temples, ancestral halls, educational institutions, 
infrastructure facilities and dynamic economic transformation 
might be seen as the ethnic identity consequence of those 
investors. These sojourn Cantonese felt culturally comfortable 
to invest in their lineage cousins and in turn, preserved 
the integrity of certain distinctive features in this single 
culture area. 
Such sense of social commitment or cultural.loyalty 
paid to ancestral homes could also partially explain the hot 
business dialogues between Taiwan and Mainland China. 
Johnson also carefully differentiated the behavior patterns 
between the overseas Chinese and the compatriots from Taiwan 
and Hong Kong. The former tended to donate and the latter to 
invest.#7 It held true to a degree in my observation in 
Fujian Province. Most of the imposing constructions bearing 
ritual or social welfare significance were generously 
sponsored by overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia. Hong Kong 
Chinese sometimes kindly gave money to develop local public 
utility. But, according to one of the officials in Xiamen, 
they were usually granted flexible terms of trade like tax 
breaks or tariffs, etc. at the same time. In a sense, their 
situational selection of ethnic identity in an alien society 
reflected the great economic concern of the bourgeois. They 
placed the "class interests, interests which cross ethnic 
and national boundaries" high above the pressing priority 
(Wang 1988:13). 
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On the one hand, the donation activities of the overseas 
Chinese could be seen as a behavior corresponding to their 
ethnic identity and a practice of community rituals. The 
museums, the Jimei business academy, and the Xiamen University 
donated by Jiageng Chen, the celebrated Singaporean merchant, 
is a good example. These cultural assets exhibited Chen's 
respect towards the Chinese lineage elaboration structure. 
Ch en impressed every Xiamenese with , his contribution to his 
ancestral home. When I expressed my doubt that Taiwanese 
merchants could find their near relatives and choose their 
investment sites in Fujian out of sheer ethnic identity, a 
Xiamen official refuted me with the case of Jiageng Chen. He 
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told me that he had helped Taiwan businesspeople many times 
out of ethnic identity. He once led a lumberer to Heilongjiang 
Province rich in timber located at the northeast China. 
He firmly said that he would never do this for a Japanese. 
He could hardly forget the resentment towards the Japanese 
stemming from Japan's military invasion upon China and using 
live Chinese to conduct bacteria experiments in northeastern 
area of Mainland during World War 11. I thus understood why 
the Japanese enterprises like Matsushida electric appliances 
and many other food industries in Xiamen would find the 
Taiwan corporations as their joint venture partners to enter 
into China market. It could at least lessen the ethnic 
tensity due to the direct encounter between China and Japan. 
Taiwanese partners could serve as a useful buffer while 
settling the business deals. 
It was a precious chance to talk with a finance 
professor in Xiamen University who had spent three years in 
Beijing to help carry out the investment and donation plans 
for Yu-kang Pao, the powerful capitalist from Hong Kong. The 
ancestral home of Pao was Ningbo, a city in Zhejiang 
Province. He intended to donate the money for the birth of 
Ningbo University. Besides, he sought to cooperate with China 
for investing steel industry. This was the first time for 
overseas Chinese to help generously to es "tablish such kind 
of ethnic industry. The Chinese leader Deng Xiao Ping valued 
highly this matter and ordered this professor who was also a 
Ningboese to settle this project. Unfortunately Pao died in 
the middle of progress and the project was discontinued. 
Ningbo University did not work out satisfactorily either. In 
Prof. Chen's opinion, it would take an incessant fanancial 
support to run a sound educational institution. Even the big 
initial cash donation would not ensure the future staffing 
and the good maintenance of the facilities. The Shantou 
University in Guangdong Province sponsored by Ka-sheng Li 
was different. It received an endless financial aids from 
this influential Hong Kong Chinese who also currently 
invested a rich variety of industries in China. 
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However, the donation behaviors, basically, did not 
contradict with the business ambitions of those overseas 
entrepreneurs. Siu-lun Wong analyzed this form of philanthropy. 
"Their donations are mainly channelled towards higher education 
the type of education they support is mostly related to 
their business vocation, such as management and engineering. 
Their major donations also tend to be directed to their 
native place, the source of their regional ties". Wong raised 
our attention that these enterpreneurs might be "keenly aware 
of the physical impermanence of their business enterprises". 
They thus sought "to ensure the immortality of t~eir family 
name" and "the perpetuation of Chinese culture and identity 
which provides the moral underpinnings to their business 
endeavours" (Wong 1995:147). 
On the other hand, the China authorities were eager to 
know what happened in the current Southeast Asian societies 
and aggressively using ethnic identity to whet the appetite 
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of their Chinese capitalists to invest in Fujian. I once 
accompanied an official Mr. Fei to get a newly published book 
by the Overseas Chinese Institute of Xiamen University. He 
served in the Association for Promotion of Asia Pacific 
Economic and Cultural Exchanges. He told me many stories 
about his tour exhibitions to show the overseas capitalists 
the Fujian industrial profile in the Philippines and Malaysia. 
And those overseas enterpreneurs were also smart to assess 
their target investment environments from ethnicity and many 
other respects. 
The large overseas group Xianglu Fibers could be a good 
example. Although Fujian was the ancestral home of all its 
establishers, by no means could the affective attachment to 
the place of origin and dialect group identity alone make 
Xiamen the ideal investment site. The good infrastructure 
and transportation were more important for them to make the 
choice. The Taiwanese manager who had been to Dongshan to 
visit his friend, offered me another example for overseas 
investments in the Mainland. One of his fellow professionals 
from Canada was a Fujianese. This immigrant from Canada run 
an entertaining business in Dongshan Island. Most of its 
consumers came from the nearby cities, especially the new 
rich profiting from the local private enterprises or the 
sons of the ruling classes who could afford such luxury. His 
investment site happened to be a rising star market town 
that China authorities eagerly planned to attract overseas 
capital. He was one of the merchants responding to the 
community of origin and the language of native place to 
set up business in his ancestral place. But out of realistic 
assessment, he chose the entertaining industry to serve both 
the local community and his personal economic consideration. 
The mutual benefit motivation of both sides was quite clear. 
The overseas Chinese from North America also included 
the elite of management and engineering. What Joel Kotkin 
described as the specemen belonged to a new breed of trans-
Pacific nomads. These Chinese diaspora traveled between and 
tied together North America and Mainland China to conduct 
business for their American technological companies. Some of 
them also established their own companies. They coordinated 
the financial links within the Chinese-dominated economies 
of East Asia and the production facilities of Mainland China 
to construct a Chinese economic zone (Kotkin 1993:168,199). 
As American citizens, they "think not so much in terms of 
nations or states but a seamless global network connecting 
communities nevertheless united by a common ethnic identity" 
(Kotkin 1993:169). It was the ethnic identity to make their 
dreams of successful international business come true. 
Hongkonges e did not differ much from Southeast Asian or 
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North American Chinese in investment motivation. In addition 
to the labor force, tax breaks, potential China market and 
low-priced land, they all deemed the easy communication due 
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to the similar language and ethnicity as a favorable factor 
(Kao 1994:195). The major difference was the scale types of 
their enterprises and the subsequent business behaviors in 
Mainland China. According to the comparative study of Charng 
Kao to investigate the foreign investments in Mainland China, 
Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan investors were different from 
Singapore, America or Japan investors in terms of enterprise 
scale and the ways of seeking their partners in the Mainland. 
Most of the Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan enterprises were 
small-sized while the Singapore, America and Japan enterprises 
were relatively large-scale (Kao 1995:209-10). In the light 
of joint venture partnerships, the former ones tended to 
cooperate with China's township enterprises to curtail the 
negotiation process and gain the profit in a compartively 
short period. The later ones tended to cooperate with the 
state and collective or parallel upper administrative level 
enterprises to secure the authorized documents at the cost 
of time. Since the lower administrative level enterprises 
were more flexible and market-oriented than those state and 
collective ones, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan mer~hants could 
expect to reap what they had invested sooner (Kao 1995:205-6). 
As to the transferring of manufacturing from Hong Kong 
to China, Alan and Josephine Smart found this process smoothly 
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facilitated by the "social linkages and cultural commonalities 
of Hong Kong investors and their Chinese counterparts". "Most 
Hong Kong investors are relatively small-scale enterprises set 
up in locations where the investors have pre-existing social 
connections Hong Kong investors generally negotiate 
directly with local officials, and the negotiations are 
usually socially mediated through their local guanxi" (Smart 
& Smart 1992:60). And the guanxi as a cultural asset which 
was transformed into their economic capital had been discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
In their research on the kin employment in Guangdong 
Province, Josephine and Alan Smart found that many Hong Kong 
factories in the Pearl River Delta used kin recruitment to 
resolve the effective capitalist labour management problems. 
Kinship "provides a context in which mutual trust can be 
established quickly, which in turn facilitates the business 
interest of both parties. One's employing his kins and other 
people from his ancestral home was "a practice which improved 
his social status in his native place, and served to fulfill 
an obligation that he felt to improve the living standards 
of his relatives and friends there. Employing kin was not 
just a cost, but also a benefit in itself" (Smar1; & Smart 
1993:16,29). 
Actually the cultural value of familism could be 
extended and applied to many other material aspects. Siu-lun 
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Wong found the kinship terms widely used in the strong 
familial ethos societies like Hong Kong and Singapore. 
"Chinese traders in Singapore have been found to refer to 
their more important business associates as 'uncles' to whom 
they are not genealogically related" (Wong 1995: 141). I once 
talked with a Xi amen official in charge of the trade promotion 
and cultural exchange with the Southeast Asian Chinese and 
Hongkongese. After spending more than a decade in Shenzhen 
and Guangzhou, he admired the open and progressive Cantonese 
way to set business in motion. He wondered why Xiamenese 
could not learn their styles to call some associates 'elder 
brother' or 'uncle' to ask for business opportunities while 
drinking tea. This direct and intimate way to pull relations 
could generate an ethnic tie and lubricate the business 
process. Ethnicity could carry a pragmatic nature in the 
business dialogues between the overseas Chinese and their 
counterparts in Mainland China. 
5.2 Taiwanese Investment and Management 
Did Taiwanese really act as Graham Johnson suggested 
that most of them aimed at investment rather than donation 
in Mainland China? Basically the motivation of Taiwan 
merchants' investing in their ancestral places was similar 
to those of Southeast Asian and Hong Kong Chinese. Yet, 
their donation activities in both the number and scale were 
overshadowed by the overseas Chinese from those two areas. 
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I knew that a female Taiwan publisher of celebrity went to 
Mei county of Guangdong Province to visit her ancestral home 
and established a hospital there around 1988. The Provincial 
governor was so moved that a Taiwan compatriot went back to 
her native place to invest such an institution bearing great 
social welfare significance. The official thought that ethnic 
identity justified her investment decision. He thus issued 
her a license for pharmaceutical manufacturing factory. This 
reward added one more profitable item to her rich varieties 
of investments in Mainland China (Wang 1995:91-2). 
On the other hand, Michael Hsiao and Alvin So found that 
many small Taiwanese investors were generous in donating 
local schools and sports arenas to invoke "their mainland 
kinship and community ties". They did so to "strengen their 
social bonds with mainlanders". And this social bonds through 
friends and kin could save them from future troubles and 
overcharging fees while going through numerous bureaucratic 
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process in the Mainland (Hsiao & So 1994:9-10). 
Taiwanese felt culturally comfortable to invest in 
Fujian. How did they differ from other overseas Chinese from 
Southeast Asia and Hong Kong concerning the ethnic identity? 
I will explore it by examining certain Taiwanese merchants in 
Fujian and Guangdong. Most of the samples I collected from 
fieldwork were small-sized family or non-family enterprises. 
There existed one interesting phenomenon deserving our 
attention. Many small Taiwanese entrepreneurs found that 
their investments in the Mainland rejuvenated their declining 
manufacturing business in Taiwan. This relocation also 
further sustained their original family form of business 
organization. Some of their commercial success in Mainland 
China even had much to do with the support of their family 
members in Taiwan. Actually, such kind of small-scale family 
or non-family firms constitute the largest amount of Taiwan 
investors in Mainland China nowadays. 
According to the explanation of Yue-man Yeung and David 
Chu, Fujian was a nice candidate for the industral relocation 
of Taiwanese businesspeople. "First, because of the fact that 
many Taiwanese came form southern Fujian, invest~ng in and 
bringing properity to their home town was part of a good 
Chinese tradition, especially for overseas Chinese. The 
investors or donors would be honoured by their fellow folks 
in one way or another. Besides, their home town offered an 
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environment that facilitated relocation, such as communication 
in the same dialect, convenience that outsiders usually could 
not enjoy and flexibility viewed sometimes as close to bending 
regulations and laws. Red tapes that outsiders found very 
annoying could be circumscribed by appealing to kinship and 
small favours if they invested in their home town. In 
addition, under the open policy and the goal of promoting a 
unified China, some privileges were legitimately accorded to 
visitors and investors from Taiwan in Fujian" (Yeung & Chu 
1 995 : 9 ) . 
Compared with other foreign investors in the Mainland, 
Taiwan enterprises constituted the largest portion of the 
foreign investors in Fujian, especially in Xiamen (Kao 1995: 
207-8). But the exact numbers of the Taiwanese investors having 
relatives or near kins in the Mainland might be little. After 
centuries of separation from the Mainland, most of the native 
Taiwanese could hardly find their near relatives or any 
kin connections there. Yet, what the advantages for investing 
in the ancestral place mentioned by Yeung and Chu still held 
true. In my field observation, the differentiation between 
the ones having relatives or connections and those having no 
relatives in the Mainland might be more apparent &than real. The 
businessmen without relatives or acquantances in the Mainland 
could also use other techniques to find their brokers and 
build delicate social connections with the authorities 
concerned as long as they became aware of the local culture. 
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Taiwanese merchants in Fujian region counted more on 
personal connections than those of other areas did to achieve 
their business success (Chiu,etc. 1994:150-1). Owing to the 
similar language and ethnicity, they could gain a deeper 
understanding about the local culture and make better use of 
guanxi capital in the local societies, just like the 
situation of Hong Kong investors in Guangdong Province 
(Smart & Smart 1992; 1993). In fact, most of the small 
Taiwan family enterprises believed the value of social 
relationships and heavily used it in Taiwan societies to set 
business in motion. Even having no near kins in the host 
societies, Taiwan businesspeople were not strange to these 
practices in Mainland China. They could dexterously find the 
substitutes to cultivate the fictive-kin relationships as 
well as guanxi-like connections, and to develop the social 
networks as needed. 
Only two cases of my ethnographic studies belonged to 
the type of Taiwan investors having relatives in Mainland. 
One of them I knew was a middle-aged woman married to a 
Mainlander moving to Taiwan in 1949. Her husband Mr. Wen had 
a nephew holding high positions in ~ommunist Par~y. After 
retiring from the civil service career, they gave all their 
money to the young man and set to work on real estate business 
in Shenzhen through his arrangement. This short cut kept them 
free from bothering about trivial but vital to red-tape 
matters. And their nephew acting as a local intermediary 
using his social connections also benefited tremendously 
from his uncle's economic support. However, their apartments 
did not sell well at the earlier stage in Shenzhen. They 
could scarcely reap any profit from what they had invested 
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and support themselves. The Wen couple thus went back to 
Taipei to raise more funds among their old neighbors and 
friends. Their primary form of guanxi which they had 
cultivated in Taiwan through years, provided them the 
sufficient capital necessary for their business career in 
Shenzhen. Through the arrangement of their Mainland relatives, 
their extended form of guanxi they exercised in Shenzhen, 
also helped to settle the bureaucratic procedures to run 
business. 
The prevalence of small factories in Taiwan told the 
psychology of these petty bourgeois that better to be the 
head of a chicken than tail of an ox. The strong drives 
towards self-employment of Taiwanese and the family-centered 
entrepreneurial ethics was received as an admitted fact by 
Richard Stites and Stevan Harrell (Stites 1985; Harrell 1985). 
S. Gordon Redding explored such spirit of Chinese capitalism 
(Redding 1990). In the course of socialization, Qne was 
instilled with Confucian philosophy stressing familism and 
authoritarianism. This cultural belief influenced his later 
life in a networked society, and the subsequent personalized 
organization run paternalistically. Redding made an effort to 
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identify the attitudes shared by businessmen that predisposed 
them to the peculiar type of family firms favoring ownership 
overlapping with management hegemony. 
Siu-lun Wong also discussed the correspondence between 
traditional stability of family and economic ties (Wong 1988, 
1995). Wong held a positive attitude towards Chinese family 
values and business networks to bring favorable social 
dynamics for industrial growth. He examined the features 
attached to paternalistic managerial ideology and practice, 
nepotistic employment, and family owenership. "The metaphor 
of the family provides a form of ready-made cultural rhetoric 
to legitimize managerial authority" (Wong 1988:137) and 
tranquilize industrial conflicts. Family members or other 
relatives provided reliable and cheap labor. The quick 
decisions were easily attained among family members. They 
all contributed to the resilience and competitiveness needed 
in times of recession or in high risky situations (Wong 1988: 
138-9). Indeed, such kind of small family firms contributed 
a great portion to the Taiwan economic prosperity in the last 
two decades. As Wong indicated, the applicability of Chinese 
family values and business networks to other sociocultural 
settings promised well for the economic development of East 
Asian societies. 
According to one investigation result by Chung-Hua 
Institute for Economic Research in 1994 (Yu & Yeh 1994), Taiwan 
120 
investors in Mainland China outweighed those in Southeast 
Asia in terms of numbers. In terms of the average capital, 
however, each case of investment in Southeast Asia was eleven 
times greater than that in the Mainland. Obviously, there were 
more Taiwanese investing capital-intensive industries in 
Southeast Asia. That kind of capital-intensive investments 
might better use quality technology, management, manpower 
and capital. These resources were generally restricted to 
transplant to the Mainland under the regulations of Taiwan 
government based on political consideration (Yu & Yeh 1994: 
65). Besides, most of the Taiwan investors in the Mainland 
adopted the form of sole ownership while those in Southeast 
Asia took the form of joint venture (Yu & Yeh 1994:199). 
The investment behaviors of the Taiwanese merchants in 
the Mainland bore much similarity to their behaviors in Taiwan. 
Those small businesspeople used to enlist the resources 
provided by their family members to run their business. The 
sound financial institutions and formal social control 
systems in Southeast Asia meant much more important to 
multinational corporations than to small-sized enterprises. 
Their drives towards self-employment also made they prefer 
sole ownership to joint venture. Most of them chose the 
labor-intensive type of industries to invest in south coast 
provinces of the Mainland. 
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5.3 Kinship and Management 
My fieldwork data convinced me that one's having no kins 
in the Mainland would not necessarily deny him having good 
relations with his Chinese counterparts in Mainland to work 
out his business strategy. The diamond merchant Mr. Pei told 
me that he usually set the deals through the local brokers. 
That could help to gain a reasonable condition on price 
acc~ptable to both parties because the middlemen knew the 
local culture better than he. The tea leaf enterpriser in 
Xiamen used the local manager to settle the administrative 
matters. The chief Eupa manager in charge of development and 
planning was also a Xiamen local. The umbrella factory owner 
got along well with Shenzhen social security officers to 
secure a cheap piece of land. The shoeparts company manager 
found it easy to buy the necessary licenses from the friends 
of the officials concerned. The mini-spring manufacturer had 
an intimate fellowship with a helpful local cadre. 
All these Taiwan firm owners or managers said above had 
no near kins in Mainland China. There is a likeness between 
Hong Kong and Taiwan investors. They tended to cooperate with 
the township enterprises in rural China districts. Many small 
Taiwan businesspeople sought the local rural enterprises as 
their partners of joint venture in the Mainland (Kao 1995: 
205-6). They might not use the Mainland kin employment as 
Hong Kong investors did (Smart & Smart 1993). But their 
knowledge of the art of guanxi paralleded those of 
Hongkongese. That kind of knowledge helped them to get 
along with their Chinese partners in the Mainland. 
For those small merchants, the local social bond in 
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their native societies was important. Much of the financial 
and human resource needed for the business careers in the 
Mainland was acquired from their kin groups and family members 
in Taiwan. The Mongolian barbecue restaurant owner told me 
that he had a brother successfully relocating a bicycle 
manufacturing factory to Shenzhen. And he was encouraged to 
buy the chainstore trademark from one of his brother-in-Iaws 
in Taichung to establish this restaurant in Xiamen. The 
medium-sized tea leaf corporation owner worked hard to set 
his business in Xiamen and take care of the leaf fields in 
nearby villages. His brother lent him financial support when 
he expressed that he wanted to expand his business zone 
northward. 
The Eupa electric appliances offered an example that 
small-medium scale enterprise rejunevated its declining 
business in Taiwan and perpetuated its family firm. The 
president of Eupa, Mr. Wu was so famous in Xiamen. During 
the periods of China Communists launching military exercises 
along Taiwan Strait in August 1995, this merchant raised his 
voice to protest against such a rude behavior threatening 
the secrutiy of Taiwan. He was a native Taiwanese. In 1987 
he went to Xiamen to set his plant. It happened to be a time 
that illegal trade with Mainland was severely banned. Facing 
the uncertain fate, he and his wife could not help crying. 
They were afraid of not being able to go back to Taiwan. 
Later their products were among the categories of indirect 
trade and investment flows toward PRC legally approved by 
Taiwan's Economic Ministry. With the low cost and sufficient 
labor force plus sound management in Xiamen, it generated 
more outputs and greater employment levels. Its production 
and profit accelerated at a dazzling speed. Eupa had now 
become a world wide known brand and owned its branch 
corporations in Taiwan, Japan, United States and Switzerland. 
It was also the first sole ownership Taiwan enterprise 
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entered into the Mainland stock market in 1993. Eupa ranked 
from a small-medium firm to become a multinational corporation. 
Wu entered into China at the opportune moment to rejuvenate 
his twenty years old enterprise (Kao 1994:134-9). 
Regarding the business expansion of family enterprises 
in a host society, David Y.R. Wu enlightened us with his case 
study of Papua New Guineas Chinese (Wu 1982). The correlation 
between kinship and entrepreneurship was apparent. Wu noticed 
the common features of entrepreneurship of overseas Chinese, 
such as "the manipulation of human relationship as an adaptive 
strategy in achieving desirable ends--success in commerce", 
"the organziation of kinship members in managing a small-scale 
enterprise which later expands both in terms of the number 
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of kinsmen organized and the volume of business transacted", 
etc. (Wu 1982:88). To understand the kinship-oriented 
entrepreneurship, we might review two cases of Taiwan family 
firms in the Mainland as follows. The development of their 
corporations revealed the managerial ideology and practice of 
personalism and paternalism. Although there attached certain 
drawbacks to family business form of organization, their 
commercial success and business expansion in Mainland was 
related with the nepotistic employment and family ownership. 
The umbrella factory I mentioned above was run by a 
Taiwanese family. Its kinship structre overlapped to a degree 
with its firm organization and corporate culture. Every 
family member had his or her own corresponding duty in the 
company. The president of this company was a capable woman. 
After her father died, she became the heir to this family 
enterprise. In 1989 she decided to move the plant to Shenzhen, 
then sent the manager who was also the husband of one of her 
classmates, and her younger brother with sister-in-law to look 
after the factory in turn. She and the other family members 
working at the company kept their paper work and office 
routines same at Taipei. She was responsible for 
securing the orders from the American and European clients. 
Before divorcing her husband, she let the man and his sister 
take the major roles in its business operation more than ten 
years. Her mother was always the company accountant. The 
errand boy was her aunt's smallest son. The secretary was her 
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college classmate. And a female worker was a person from her 
same home town in central Taiwan as well as her mother's high 
school classmate. There were a man and a woman had no previous 
connections with this family before entering into this firm. 
These two persons were also the group ususally excluded from 
the company meeting and alienated from the family discussion. 
After analyzing the belief and workflow operation of the 
Chinese family enterprises, S. Gordon Redding found the 
unfortunate traits attached to the small scale firms. Redding 
argued that personalism denied "the emergence of the kind of 
objectivity and neutrality in which truly rational and 
professional bureaucracy can flourish" (Redding 1990:135). 
And paternalism allowed that "nobody outside the owning group 
can generate for himself truly legitimate authority" (Redding 
1990:158). They all led to capital starvation and impaired 
the optimal organizational growth. However, it seemed that 
the management based on personal relationships did not bother 
this family firm said above. Its production and profit 
progressed at a steady pace. As to the familial values and 
industrial growth, Ambrose King weighed the nepotism in a 
different way. It never vanished in employee recruitment 
might because the mutual trust between family members was 
still cherished, and believed to stablize organizational 
development as well as enhance corporate interests (King 
1991b). This family enterprise was now expanding its assembly 
lines in Mainland to cope with the flooding order slips from 
western nations. Its family members worked harder than ever 
before to handle their increasing company duties. 
Miss Tsai, the woman scolding the Mainland factory 
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worker for stealing the offerings from the altar at an event 
of 15th worshipping, was the president of that mini-spring 
company. She grew up in a mercantile family in the suburbs of 
Taipei. In 1989 she went alone to Xiamen to seek for business 
opportunity. After establishing the same type of manufacturing 
business there, she took her father, mother and younger 
brother to look after the plant and continued their family 
business. She developed her own interest in department store 
business and focused on man-made high-class suits. Now she 
not only became the Xiamen deputy of a famous Taiwan suit 
brand, but also was the share holder of its plants in Shanghai 
and Hungzhou city in Jiang-su Province. She spent twenty days 
per month in Shanghai and ten days in Xiamen. 
Most of her employees of mini-spring factory in Xiamen 
were from Jiang-xi Province because her mother was once an 
adopted daughter of a KMT soldier retreating from Mainland 
in 1949 to Taiwan. The native place of this adopter happened 
to be Jiang-xi. Her father also engaged himself in the real 
estate business with zest. He was so lenient towards those 
Jiang-xi workers that they usually idled about in the office 
hours without fearing being fired. The young lady president 
always disagreed with her father's way to treat the people 
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holding views different from their usual familial values in 
Taiwan. There was once a time that a relative Jiang-xi worker 
stole the suit stocks from her warehouse. She was really mad 
when she sighted the suits worn by his wife. This worker took 
his other five brothers and sisters from Jiang-xi to serve this 
company. This lady president and her family members treated 
them nicely. Why should such things still happen? Did they 
spoil the Mainland relative workers? She became harsher 
after learning this lesson. 
With the expanding of their manufacturing business, her 
older brother and the son of her uncle established another 
factory in Shenzhen to deal with the increasing product 
demand. Now her uncle and his wife moved to Xiamen to live 
with her parents. That made life busy without sacrificing 
family happiness. This lady was an optimistic woman. She 
told me that she also tried to open the Beijing suits market 
by setting a counter in a renown deparment store. In her 
progress to achieve her multi-products manufacturing and 
saling in Mainland China, she enlisted the human resources 
from most of her family members in Taiwan. Their cooperation 
made her empire of family enterprise grow much stronger than 
ever before. Her familiar terms with one local cadre also 
saved her family corporation from many hardships generally 
gone through by the strangers in a host society. The kinship 
and enterpreneurship had much to do with her family's 
industrial relocation and commercial success in the Mainland. 
5.4 Taiwanese Employees in Multinational Corporations 
Why was this group included in my discussion on the 
ethnicity and business behavior? It was important because it 
brought a parallel case of non-Chinese foreign enterprises 
to test the significance of cultural affinity in the business 
discourses. An interesting phenomenon came to my attention 
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while I was conducting the research of Taiwanese merchants in 
Mainland China. In field interviews, I frequently encountered 
Taiwanese managers and technicians who were sent to the Mainland 
by American and European multinational corporations. These 
managerial and technical personnel were needed for the 
reasons of culture, language and technology. Such kind of 
Chinese expatriate managers I knew recently also included 
one Singaporean Miss Cheng serving for a Japanese financial 
institution in Hong Kong to develop the business relations 
with Taiwanese merchants in Fujian. I believed that her 
langauge ability of Minnan dialect and Mandarin helped her 
gain this job. The Hongkongese Mr. Lee went to Guangzhou 
quite often to negotiate with the Cantonese officials for an 
American multinational corporation. He earned his MEA degree 
in the United States and could speak Mandarin fluently. And 
one America-born Chinese Mr. Fu wh~ learned his ~hinese from 
his parents in New York, became an ideal candidate for the 
expatriate in the business travels to Shanghai. 
All their experiences guided me to think a problem of 
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the ambiguity of symbolic actions of human societies posed by 
Victor Turner in his Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors (Turner 
1974). In the interaction between capitalism and socialism, 
these expatriates acted as the social linkage to bridge two, 
in a sense, cultural conflict societies. They were the 
representatives of the western or Japanese organizations in 
the Mainland. But they were physically ethnic Chinese themselves. 
In addition to their knowledge of Chinese culture, did their 
ethnic identity bear the smybolic function to assuage the 
cultural cleavage between two different ethnic societies? In 
my observation, their being Chinese did carry the ethnic 
symbolic meaning to facilitate their mediary action in the 
negotiation process in Mainland China. But I wondered how 
they perceived their positions in relation to their home 
country organizations as well as to their Chinese counterparts 
in the Mainland. Did their cultural sensitivity to Chinese 
societies expedite the cultural transformation to sinicize the 
business operation of foreign companies in China? They were 
entrepreneur bureaucratic middlemen and cultural brokers to 
ride the waves of cultural diversity in business. After 
finishing their tasks in the host societies, they reaffirmed 
their social identity and reintegrated into their home 
country organizations in the United States, Europe and Japan. 
To Victor Turner, ritual metaphor functioned as a 
vihicle for mediating fissions in a phase of liminality and 
a state of communitas (Turner 1974:37,56). In a sense, these 
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ethnic Chinese were such ritual metaphors themselves. They 
brought the ambiguity of symbolic communication that helped 
avoid the chaos erupting from a cross-ethnicity tension when 
the west met the east. They controlled not only the important 
communication channels, but also the access to the head 
quarters of power and authority. They won their colleagues 
of ethnic outsiders to their interpretation of the Chinese 
local community culture. Yet, why were they entrusted with 
such roles in this social drama to act as intermediary in 
facilitating the east-west business dialogues? 
These expatriates were sent by their non-Chinese 
employers to bridge the ethnic and cultural distance with a 
Chinese commercial society. They obtained the understanding 
and support of those foreign organizations. However, there 
existed numerous Americans, Europeans and Japanese capable 
of bilingual Chinese-English. Why were these ethnic Chinese 
chosen to substitute for their bosses' fellow countrymen in 
the United States, Europe and Japan? Quite a few non-Chinese 
parallelling their Chinese language and technological skills 
were excluded from the consideration lists. Randall Stross 
deemed it an unfair fact concerning the expatriates in the 
Mainland. "Chinese-speaking Americans who were nqt ethnically 
Chinese saw that they were excluded from the blood nexus that 
tied Chinese-Americans to the motherland, , and they saw deals 
were lost as a result ... These ... were often explained by 
foreigners as illustrations of the importance of guanxi in 
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Chinese culture" (Stross 1990:142). 
The personal connections and the racial rhetoric was 
obvious choice for foreign corporations to appoint managers 
in the business expedition to China. The social relationship 
was regarded as a major asset during the culture shock period 
for foreigners in Mainland China. Such cultural sensitivity 
to guanxi was difficult to acquire for non-Chinese. On the 
other hand, ethnic Chinese might hold the natural advantage 
on the strenghth of their early socialization process in 
family lives to master the art of guanxi. That could partly 
explain the comparatively large numbers of Chinese expatriate 
managers in Mainland China. 
The cost-benefit analysis might also contribute to 
this result. The Hongkongese manager mentioned above and 
two managers from Taiwan working for American corporations 
all pointed out that a British or American expatriate manager 
might cost twice or three times of their salaries. The cost 
analysis partially decided the outcome that the bosses would 
rather use the Taiwanese or Hongkongese well versed in 
English to settle their sales or technical problems in China. 
But, they also indicated that some of their American or 
British colleagues were not well adapted themselves to their 
Mainland lives due to the unfamiliar custom. Annually they 
only stayed a relatively short period there. On the contrary, 
Chinese expatriates could spend the larger part of a whole 
year there without too much difficulty. 
Again, they all felt that Chinese linguistic expression 
itself was not so easy to grasp for non-Chinese. Successful 
business communication depended heavily on contextual cues 
such as nonverbal behaviors, social situations, and the 
nature of interpersonal relationships (Ferraro 1994:50-4). 
Differnt forms of the same language were spoken depending 
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on the social situations (Ferraro 1994:54). In many occasions, 
foreigners could not explain the conversations in the literal 
sense of the word. The high correlation between language and 
social context made the verbal messages difficult to follow. 
The indirect styles of communication might not suit the 
businesspeople from the low context culture societies like 
the United States or West Europe in the negotiation occasions 
(Ferraro 1994:52). 
In recent years, quite a few European, American and 
Japanese pharmaceutical industries held high expectation 
towards the potential big China market. They generally sought 
the Taiwanese enterprises as their joint partners and set to 
make their ventures on a first track in the Mainland. According 
to one Taiwanese representative for Japanese fir~ in the 
Mainland, those foreign multinational corporations trusted 
the people like Taiwanese sharing the same language and 
ethnicity with their counterparts in Mainland China to 
facilitate the business operations (Chang 1995:142-3). 
5.5 Patterns of Investments 
Most of the Taiwanese investors in Mainland China 
adopted the form of sole ownership while those in Southeast 
Asia took the form of joint venture (Yu & Yeh 1994:199). 
According to the comparative study of foreign investments in 
Mainland China conducted by Charng Kao, American and Japanese 
entrepreneurs tended to adopt the form of joint venture while 
Singaporean and Taiwanese enterprisers tended to take the 
form of sole ownership (Kao 1995:205). Wei-ru Chen also 
indicated that the Taishang in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces 
showed more tendency to take the investment form of sole 
ownership than those in other regions of Mainland China did 
(Chen 1996a:38-9,53). Taiwanese businesspeople, overall, 
revealed in the investment a propensity for sole ownership 
of entry mode than those non-Chinese investors did. They 
inclined to invest in the common-traditional areas sharing 
the similar culture with them. Concerning the wholly owned 
greenfield investment, Mainland China was favored over 
Southeast Asia, and Fujian and Guangdong were favored over 
the other regions of the Mainland. 
Bruce Kogut and Harbir Singh (,1988) lent us theoretical 
as well as empirical support to explain the relationship 
between a firm's country of origin and the mode of entry in 
foreign investment. According to Kogut and Singh, there 
existed a negative correlation between the wholly owned 
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investment and the psychic distance. Psychic distance "is 
meant the degree to which a firm is uncertain of the 
characteristics of a foreign .market". It "would be influenced 
by differences in the culture and language of the home and 
target countries" (Kogut & Singh 1988:413). Compared with 
the other countries making the foreign direct investment in 
the United States, United Kingdom and Canada adopted, to a 
high degree, the acquisitions and wholly owned greenfield as 
their entry modes. Their culturally relatively similar to 
each other might shorten the psychic distance between the 
nation of investing firm and the nation of entry (Kogut & 
Singh 1988:419). It was based on the hypothesis that "the 
more culturally distant the country of the investing firm 
from the United States, the more likely the choice to set up 
a joint venture" (Kogut & Singh 1988:422). With the rather 
small cultural distance between the United Kongdom and the 
United States, the former might select the acquisistions and 
wholly owned greenfield investment to enter into the U.S. 
market. 
With the easy communication due to similar language and 
ethnicity, the cultural distance between Mainland China and 
Taiwan or Singapore was certainly short. From this point of 
view, Taiwanese or Singaporean entrepreneurs might exhibit 
more sole ownership tendency than the United States or Japan 
did in their Mainland China investment. Besides, compared 
with the multinational corporations of North America, the 
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enterpr~ses of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia Chinese 
showed a strong preference towards family firms with ownership 
overlapping with management hegemony (Yearbook of the World 
Chinese Entrepreneurs 1995:227). These Chinese family firms 
usually took the form of sole ownership and enlisted the 
financial as well as human resources from their family 
members. Most of them changed little such investment form to 
enter into Mainland China. They still observed the cultural 
belief and practice towards familial values to set up their 
business in the Mainland. 
For Taiwanese entrepreneurs, the cultural distance with 
Mainland China was smaller than that with Southeast Asia. 
That could partially explain why their sole ownership 
investment cases in the Mainland were greater than those in 
Southeast Asia. By the same token, the culture of Fujian and 
Guangdong was more familiar to them. That could also partly 
explain why their wholly owned investment cases in Fujian and 
Guangdong were larger than those in other areas of the Mainland. 
Kogut and Singh also hypothesized that the "more 
uncertainty avoiding a culture tends to be, the less 
attractive is the acqusitions mode due to the organizational 
risks of integrating foreign management into the parent 
organization" (Kogut & Singh 1988:423). It was possible that 
United Kingdom and Canada bore less uncertain avoidance 
towards their direct investment in the United States which 
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was relatively culturally similar to them. According to 
the uncertainty avoidance index values empirically found by 
Geert Hofstede, Taiwan rated midway between the weak and 
strong uncertainty avoidance index while Singapore hit the 
lowest index value (Hofstede 1991:113). Both of them were 
excluded from the strong uncertainty avoidance societies. 
Their choosing wholly owned greenfield investment to enter 
China market was not at variance with such value orientation. 
It corresponded well with the venturous spirit of Chinese 
entrepreneurship and strong self-employment drives. 
There existed an interesting phenomenon relating to the 
self-employment drives. Although the average capital of each 
Taiwan investment in Southeast Asia was much greater than that 
of Taiwan investment in the Mainland, the number of Taiwan 
investment items in the Mainland was much larger than that of 
investment categories in Southeast Asia. The rich variety 
could partially indicate that Mainland China implied more 
business opportunities for those small businessmen with 
venturous spirits. It also raised the possibility that more 
kinds of Taiwan products might be customized to suit the 
Mainland consumers and rejuvenate their small-medium scale 
consuming product industries in the potential China market 
(Yu & Yeh 1994:204-5). 
Last summer I encountered a Taiwanese merchant for plant 
medicinal materials in Xiamen. He told me that he began his 
business adventure in 1985. At first, he identified the 
supply sources in Northeast Provinces of the Mainland, then 
gradually sought the export markets in Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Southeast Asia and Japan on his own instead of searching the 
joint venture partners to cooperate. I was impressed with 
his diligence and entrepreneurial spirit. 
Both the cultural familiarity with Mainland China and 
the strong self-employment drive contributed to the sole 
ownership pattern of Taiwanese investment in the Mainland. 
However, Taishang also exhibited their anxiety towards the 
uncertain government policies of China and Taiwan. Numerous 
entrepreneurs chose the sole ownership investment to protect 






The objects of study in this thesis comprised four types 
of businesspeople as follows: 
1. Family or non-family based small and medium enter-
prises run by native Taiwanese with no relatives in China. 
The institutional foundation of Taiwan's business organization 
was typically small-scale family-based firm. This family firm 
structure was not replaced by modern organizational types even 
had its manufacturing plants moved to the Mainland. The family 
firms usually sent one of the family members who are in charge 
to look after the factories in Shenzhen and Shantou in 
Guangdong or Xiamen in Fujian. The other family members 
working at the home companies in Taipei handled the paper 
work and office routines in the same fashion. Those non-
family-based small enterprises made no much difference from 
this manner. Periodically or irregularly they sent their 
staffs on an errand for the supply sources or shipment 
matters. They just used the low-cost labor force in China to 
earn marginal profit and kept their business surviving in 
the commercial society filled with competition. 
2. The investors from Taiwan who had relatives or 
connections in the Mainland. The amount was so small that it 
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hardly counted. 
3. Big Taiwanese enterprises enjoying high reputation. 
These new corners, in general, were cherished and kindly 
supported by the Chinese government. They seemed to integrate 
well with the dynamics of modern industrial capitalism and 
made "the three-pronged investment in manufacturing, marketing, 
and management essential to exploit fully the economies of 
scale and scope" (Chandler 1990:393). Contrary to those 
personally managed and personally owned enterprises favoring 
current dividends over long-term growth, they were committed 
to large-scale, long-term reinvestment in their enterprises. 
4. Taiwanese, Hong Kong Chinese or Chinese-Americans 
working for foreign enterprises in the Mainland. Many 
American, European or Japanese corporations would rather 
send managers from Taiwan or Hong Kong than use their fellow 
country men as executives. The Chinese-Americans were deemed 
as being cut out for the expatriates in China. To promote the 
product or facilitate the investment, it seemed reasonal to 
hire these ethnic Chinese. They were superior to the non-
Chinese staff from their home country organizations in 
language ability as well as the insights to hand~e public 
relations within Chinese community. 
The differentiation between the first two categories 
might be more apparent than real. Actually the businessmen 
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without relatives or acquantances in the Mainland could also 
use other techniques to find their brokers and build delicate 
social connections with the authorities concerned as long as 
they became aware of the local culture. Unlike the small-
medium enterprises tending to count the easy communication 
due to similar language and ethnicity as the most favorable 
factor in the Mainland's investment climate, the big 
enterprises depended more on modern legal system or other 
formal social control systems. But category three and four 
still offered many examples of personal relationships or 
social networks pertaining to traditional Chinese culture. 
Type four was important because it brought a parallel case 
of non-Chinese foreign enterprises to test the significance 
of cultural affinity in the business discourses. 
Category one constituted most part of the Taishang in 
Mainland China. Numerous small-medium labor-intensive and 
export-oriented Taiwan enterprises relocated their assembly 
lines to the southern coastal provinces of the Mainland in 
1980s. They solved their immediate domestic labor shortage, 
high-priced land and other industrial problems by taking 
advantage of China's preferrential policy towards overseas 
Chinese investors. This region happened to be an area 
sharing common traditional custom with Taiwan. Taiwanese 
felt culturally comfortable to invest in this zone due to 
similar language and ethnicity. 
Nevertheless, both the .China policies towards foreign 
investment and the entry modes of Taiwan enterprises 
themselves had gone through a drastic change in 1990s. On 
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the one hand, the Mainland authorities were now actively 
developing the northern and inland regions to bridge the 
economic distance between the north and south, and the 
coastal and inland regions. The preferrential policies were 
extended to those areas other than the Special Economic 
Zones having much connections with overseas Chinese. And 
non-Chinese investors from all over the world were allowed to 
enter into the Mainland market with the equal opportunities 
enjoyed by overseas Chinese. 
On the other hand, the investment patterns of the new 
Taishang were different from those of the early comers. 
According the new trend of Taiwan's investing activities 
in Mainland China found by Min Shi, "Taiwan investors' plan 
to 'Run away with the capital as soon as fighting breaks out' 
was replaced by that of 'Striking roots in the earth'. They 
invest no longer mainly in medium and small enterprises but 
in businesses of all scales. Instead of investing mainly in 
labor-intensive industries, they have made investment in 
part of the capital- and technology~based industries as well. 
They have extended the areas of their investment from the 
coastal regions to the northern part and hinterland of the 
Mainland" (Shi 1995:12). 
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This new progress of the "expansion of the localities of 
investment", the "expansion of the fields of, and the rising 
oft h e I eve I 0 f, i n v est men t " ', the "e I e vat ion 0 f the s c a I e 0 f 
investment" and the "extending of the period of investment" 
was further confirmed by Yanshen Wei (Wei 1995:12-3). There 
included many Taiwanese new corners of large-scale and capital-
or technology-intensive enterprises. They aimed at China's 
import market and tended to use the joint venture to explore 
the sales channels or source supplies in the Mainland. Their 
investment sites moved northward and inward compared with 
those early corners. Even their patterns of donation behavior 
had changed a lot. Some of them chose to sponsor orphanages 
or clean the city environment, instead of building ancestral 
halls or local schools. They rendered social services to 
better their corporation image. 
The current situation suggested the increasing importance 
of the Taishang categories three and four. But the Taishang 
types one and two would still constitute the significant 
portion of the Taiwanese businesspeople in Mainland China. 
In recent years, numerous Taiwanese investors noticed the 
potential of the Mainland township enterprises in manufacturing 
the foodstuffs and other livelihood ' products of great demand 
for the north or inland regions of China. With the unchanged 
Mainland policy to create the jobs for the surplus rural 
population and shorten the economic distance between the 
urban and country areas, the rural industrial enterprises 
might promise well for those small entrepreneurs tending to 
cultivate and use their social connections in the local 
communities in their business operation. 
Although more multinational corporations from all over 
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the world would enter into the China market, the socio-cultural 
assets held by the ethnic Chinese might continue to throw an 
impact upon the foreign investment in Mainland China. Those 
Chinese expatriates of the category four owned the inter-
cultural communication abilities and the knowledge to 
decipher the symbols and rituals of a local community 
culture. This was a strong argument for making cultural 
considerations part of strategic planning in a foreign market. 
"Successful intercultural encounters presuppose that the 
partners believe in their own value" (Hofstede 1991 :237). The 
rule of social relationship was indispensible to communicate 
in a high-context language society. That made the personal 
connections and racial rhetoric still mattered in the 
Mainland investment. 
Now the overseas Chinese investment constituted most 
part of foreign investment in Mainland China. Much of their 
cultural belief and practice pertaining to Chinese tradition 
would not be likely to vanish in an investment environment 
sharing much common value orientation with them. Even the 
multinational corporations of the Taishang category three 
could not be totally free from using the guanxi networks to 
settle their problems. For those big enterprises of non-
Chinese, they might find the Chinese expatriate managers 
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to handle the public relations problems in the host societies 
for them. For Taiwanese firms, it cost less efforts for 
multinational corporations to pave the way for guanxi 
networks with their partners in the Mainland because the 
China authorities generally prized the relations with the 
big foreign enterprises. Mainland authorities actively 
sought to cooperate with them partly because they generated 
more output and brought greater employment levels. They 
negotiated directly with the central authorities instead of 
dealing business matters by using local social connections. 
In a sense, they could use guanxi more justifiably for the 
blessing from the central authorities. Basically, they 
followed the legal procedures to set up their business and 
only used guanxi in certain situations as they saw fit. The 
rule of law could work hand in hand with the rule of social 
relationships to facilitate their business operation. 
Besides, the new China policy in 1990 allowed more 
foreign service industries and other third industries like 
department stores, supermarkets and banks to enter into the 
Mainland market. Such industries aiming at Mainlqnd consumers 
could involve more personal interactions and human problems. 
Those large-scale enterprises might highlight the importance 
of public relations and the ensuing social networks issue to 
cope with it. They showed their desire to build more personal 
relations and social connections to establish the active 
sales channels and to open more potential markets. Some 
special business categories like restaurants, Karaoke 
Televisions or other entertaining business even needed the 
firm and extensive guanxi with the authorities concerned to 
ensure their security. Judging from the foreign investment 
items newly approved by the Mainland authorities, certain 
cultural factors congenial to social networks building might 
be used more heavily to boost the business dialogues between 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs and their counterparts in Mainland 
China. Again, the shared identity based on similar culture 
and ethnicity might prove to be useful to develop guanxi 
and business networks. The cultural knowledge could still 
remain its significant role for Taishang and other foreign 
investors in Mainland China. 
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Notes: 
1. Interviewed with Dr. Charng Kao on 1st June 1995 at The 
Chung-Hua Institute of Economic Research in Taipei. 
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2. Interviewed with Mr. Haihong Zhou at The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong on 24th April 1996. 
3. Seminar talk on '" Cantonese Cuisine', 'Taiwanese Cuisine', 
and the Emergence of Taiwan Identity", presented by David 
Y.H. Wu on 17th November 1995 at The Dept. of Anthropology, 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
4. Seminar talk on "The Grounding of Cosmopolitans: A 
Historical Perspective on Merchants in South Chinese 
Local Society", presented by Helen F. Siu on 8th March 
1996 at The Dept. of Anthropology, The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong. 
5. Seminar talk on "The Grounding of Cosmopolitans: A 
Historical Perspective on Merchants in South Chinese 
Local Society", presented by Helen F. Siu on 8th March 
1996 at The Dept. of Anthropology, The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong. 
6. Seminar talk on "Villages in the Pearl River Delta: A 
Twenty-Year Perspective", presented by Graham Johnson on 
27th October 1995 at The Dept. of Anthropology, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
7. Seminar talk on "Villages in the Pearl River Delta: A 
Twenty-Year Perspective", presented by Graham Johnson on 
27th October 1995 at The Dept. of Anthropology, The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
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